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162 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
“The old gray mare, she ain’t what she used to be,
Ain’t what she used to be, ain’t what she used to be,
The old gray mare, she ain’t what she used to be,
Many long years ago.”1 
INTRODUCTION
Decided in 1827, Martin v. Mott is one of the Supreme Court’s earliest
opinions on executive power over United States citizens during a national
crisis.2 Perhaps because Justice Joseph Story, the author of Mott, penned,
“We are all of opinion, that the authority to decide whether the exigency
has arisen, belongs exclusively to the President, and that his decision is
conclusive upon all other persons,” scholars have insisted that the Court
recognized a vast power in the presidency to call citizens into military
service as well as possess an absolute command over the armed forces.3 
For instance, in 1951, Clinton Rossiter expounded that Mott stood for the 
proposition that a president’s “war power” cannot be “shackled” with
“sophistries about the nature and purpose of the militia.”4 He also penned,
“the complex system of government of the democratic, constitutional state
is essentially designed to function under normal, peaceful condition,” and
then implied that in wartime the courts cannot protect individual rights to
the same degree as in times of peace.5 
1. On this song, see Frances M. Barbour, Some Uncommon Sources of
Proverbs, 13 MIDWEST FOLKLORE 97–100 (1963).
2. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
3. Id. at 30. See also CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF 16–17 (1951) [hereinafter ROSSITER, THE SUPREME 
COURT] (concluding that when the president decides to use military force to
preserve the peace, neither the decision itself nor the methods employed are open
to the courts of the United States); John F. O’Connor, The Origins and Application
of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV. 161 (2000) (citing Mott as the
first opinion to advance the judicial branch’s deference doctrine on military law).
4. ROSSITER, supra note 3, at 15. On Rossiter’s influence in political science
studies as well as on the law, see David Rudenstein, Roman Roots for an Imperial
Presidency: Revisiting Clinton Rossiter’s 1948 Constitutional Dictatorship:
Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1063, 1064
(2013); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its
Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1799 (2009).
5. CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS
GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 5 (1948) [hereinafter ROSSITER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP].
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1632021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
Rossiter was not alone in his views. In 1972 Eugene Rostow, a one-
time dean of Yale’s law school and Under Secretary of State during
President Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, claimed that Mott enabled a
president to commit the United States to an undeclared war.6 In 1996,
Professor John Yoo, an adherent to the unitary executive theory,7 gave 
Rossiter’s observation further life in writing that Jacob Mott had failed to
convince the judiciary that it, rather than the president, should be the final
arbiter of what constitutes an emergency.8 None of these statements, as
evidenced in the history of the appeal and what the Court actually decided,
are close to being fully accurate. Indeed, preeminent among the
misinterpretations of Mott is that the Court actually continued to tolerate a
degree of state judicial oversight of federal courts-martial, thereby not
recognizing a wholly new expanded executive power.
Although there are several scholars who advocate for a unitary 
executive theory, it is helpful to recognize that Justice Antonin Scalia
articulated a judicial definition for the theory in his Morrison v. Olson
6. Eugene Rostow, Letter to the Editor, Undeclared War is Not
Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1972, at 42.
7. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes
to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65 (2006). Professor Katyal notes that the unitary
executive theory of the presidency typically refers to the idea that the president
controls the executive branch and the corollary proposition that Congress cannot
dictate how the president supervises or directs subordinates who exercise
executive power. Id. at 69 n.16 (citing Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes,
The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1153, 1165–66 (1992)). Professor Katyal then notes that the Bush
administration employed an extreme view of executive power, which emphasized
an alleged presidential authority to act even without Congress or in defiance of
the laws, as the administration “was sold a wild-eyed theory, masquerading as a
unitary executive concept.” Id. I agree with Katyal’s interpretation of both the
traditional view and the recent extremism of the theory. For the purpose of this
Article, the extreme view of the theory is what is criticized.
8. John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 289–90 (1996). For a similar
interpretation, see Amy McCarthy, Unequal Law, Unequal Burden: The All-Male
Selective Service Act, Civilian Rights, and the Limits of Military Deference in
Modern Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 45 FLA. ST. L. REV. 137, 150–52 (2017).
In 1880, Thomas McIntyre Cooley penned, “Congress may confer upon the
President the power to call [the militia] forth, and this makes him the exclusive
judge when the exigency has arisen for the exercise of the authority.” THOMAS M.
COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 91 (2d ed. 1891). But this is not necessarily so, as Congress
could also withdraw its discretionary grant.
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164 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
dissent.9 Morrison arose from Assistant Attorney General Theodore
Olson’s challenge to the Office of Independent Counsel’s subpoena
authority.10 Olson argued, with Scalia in agreement, that the independent
counsel’s issuance of subpoenas intruded into the separation of powers.11 
Scalia insisted that all executive powers reside in the executive and, as 
such, are immunized from judicial, if not direct legislative, incursion.12 
Three years after the Court issued Morrison, in Freytag v. Commissioner,
an appeal arising from a challenge to the appointment of tax court judges,
Scalia obliquely cited to Mott for the proposition that while a presidential
determination to employ the militia may have a judicial aspect as a result
of the deliberative process in deciding the existence of an emergency, the
determination to do so is solely vested in the president.13 Certainly, a
president’s commander in chief authority is broad and demands a higher
adherence of obedience of service-members because of its military
application, but Scalia’s incorporation of Mott into his reasoning in
Freyberg was in error.14 
A number of scholars, jurists, and pundits have also posited that Mott
reinforces a president’s ability to use military forces, including the
National Guard under the current version of the Insurrection Act, by 
precluding judicial review of presidential actions.15 Others have argued 
9. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. Id. 
11. Id.
12. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing article II, § 1, clause 2 of the
U.S. Constitution as lodging “all of the executive power [in the president]”). For
a view that Justice Scalia’s dissent was merely a “warm-up” to advance his belief,
see Noel J. Francisco, Justice Scalia: Constitutional Conservative, 84 U. CHI. L.
REV. 2169, 2171 (2017).
13. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 909–10 (1991) (Scalia J., concurring)
(citing Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 280
(1856)). That the Court in Murray’s Lessee emplaced Mott—as a matter of
executive branch authority to declare an emergency—into a gratuitously favorable
comparison with the auditing of public money accounts by a federal receiver does
not seem to have troubled Scalia.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 926 (2009) (citing
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955)).
15. Jackie Gardina, Toward Military Rule? A Critique of Executive 
Discretion to Use the Military in Domestic Emergencies, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1027,
1062–64 (2008). In 1941, the eminent historian Henry Steele Commager argued
to the nation that allegations that President Franklin Roosevelt’s military policies
were dictatorial were unfounded, in part, as a result of Martin v. Mott. See Henry
Commager, The War Powers of The President: A Historian Examines the Present
Charge of “Dictatorship,” N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1941, at 3.
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  169 11/19/21  12:01 PM




    
   
    






   
     
  
    
   
  
 
     
     
 
      
 
 
      
    
   
 
    




   
  
 
         
  
      
        
  
    
 
    
 
   
   
1652021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
that Mott enables presidential determinations of emergencies as an innate
constitutional power.16 Yet another category of scholarship has stressed
that when officials act under the color of presidential order they are
immune from suit.17 The view of Mott sanctioning a broad commander in
chief authority over the military makes further sense when one considers
that as the War of 1812 came to an end, Story expressed to a confidant that
the United States’ future greatness rested, in part, on its military and naval
strength.18 
Nowhere in the contemporary military law scholarship does the actual
history of Mott appear, and without such a history, Rossiter’s line of
reasoning, as well as the conventional interpretation that Story and the
Court intended to preclude judicial review of presidential national-security 
actions, remains an important part of legal discourse regarding executive 
branch supremacy.19 An expansive use of Mott, as characterized by
Rossiter, Rostow, and Yoo, has insulated the presidency in other areas. For
16. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA.
L. REV. 1361, 1380–81 (2009); see also Michael Bahar, The Presidential
Intervention Principle: The Domestic Use of the Military and the Power of the
Several States, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 537, 553–54 (2014) (arguing the Mott
Court’s broad affirmation of presidential power over the States for foreign
invasions hints at more than just statutory interpretation).
17. See Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory
Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1182–83 (2009). Stack’s comment, however,
appears to be an exaggeration of Mott’s early impact. For instance, in 1828, in
Shoemaker v. Nesbit, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined, in
following Vanderheyden v. Young, 11 Johns. 150 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814)—a 
decision of New York’s Supreme Court of Judicature—that if a militia soldier
were amendable to a court-martial, the officer charging the soldier was immune
from suit when the officer followed orders, as would be the officers serving on
the court-martial should they mistakenly conclude jurisdiction when no
jurisdiction existed. 2 Rawle 201, 203 (Pa. 1828). One might conclude that the
Court, in Mott, made very little impact on the issue of civil suits arising from
military actions, since the state court did not cite to the opinion.
18. Irving Brant, Madison and the War of 1812, 74 VA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 51, 54 (1966) (citing Letter from Joseph Story to Nathaniel Williams
(Feb. 22, 1815), in 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 254 (William W. Story
ed., 1851)); R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY:
STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 84 (1986).
19. For a countervailing view, see Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and
Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian
Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649 (2002). Professor Turley commented
that while there is merit to applying the demand for obedience to military orders,
this demand should not form the basis for a separate comprehensive system of
military justice such as under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Id. at 698.
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166 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
instance, in decisions on executive authority in non-military matters,
judges have cited to Mott for the proposition that when Congress grants to
the executive an authorization, the executive branch’s determination to act
on the authorization is not subject to judicial review.20 This Article 
illustrates how Mott’s history evidences that the Court intended the
decision to be confined to a singular question over presidential use of
militia to repel a foreign invasion and not for a broader purpose, save one:
in 1962, Henry Steel Commager penned in a New York Times article that
in the aftermath of the War of 1812, “nationalism found eloquent
spokesmen in every realm,” and in the following two sentences he listed
Joseph Story and Mott as evidence of this claim.21 But Story’s
“nationalism” was not specifically designed to create a powerful president;
rather, it was designed to nationalize the law.22 
In one sense, Mott originated in a British invasion from Canada into
New York in August 1814 during a congressionally declared war. On
August 4, 1814, and again on August 29, New York Governor Daniel
Tompkins ordered his state militia into the military service of the United
States and to assemble in an area designated as the Third Military
District.23 As a citizen of New York, Jacob Mott had a state constitutional
duty to comply with the governor’s order.24 Prior to Tompkins’ orders,
20. See, e.g., United States v. George S. Bush & Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 371, 380
(1940) (holding that a presidential determination on tariff increases to Japanese
canned goods is not subject to judicial review); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v.
Reagan, 870 F.2d 723, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding the presumption of regularity
in executive branch decisions emanates from Mott); Oak Tree Farm Dairy, Inc. v.
Block, 544 F. Supp. 1351 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that the Secretary of
Agriculture may issue milk marketing order, and such order is deemed regular);
but see Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 18 (1866) (Although in Mott the Court
recognized that the president is the “sole judge of the exigencies, necessities, and
duties of the occasion, their extent and duration,” there is no authority to prosecute
citizens in a military trial when the civil courts are functioning.).
21. Henry Steele Commager, Second War of America’s Independence: The
War of 1812 is the ‘forgotten’ war, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1962, at 15.
22. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v.
Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT.
REV. 247, 264.
23. RICHARD V. BARBUTO, NIAGARA 1814: AMERICA INVADES CANADA 336
(2000) [hereinafter BARBUTO, NIAGARA 1814].
24. See N.Y. CONST. art. XL (1777). Article XL stated:
And whereas it is of the utmost importance to the safety of every State
that it should always be in a condition of defence; and it is the duty of
every man who enjoys the protection of society to be prepared and
willing to defend it; this convention therefore, in the name and by the
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  171 11/19/21  12:01 PM









    
   
    








    
  
   
   
 






      
          
   
    
  
      
  
   
    
   
     
  
 
       
   
 
1672021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
President James Madison had issued a requisition for several state militias
to assemble into the federal army to thwart the invasion.25 Both Madison
and Tompkins possessed the constitutional and statutory authority to order
the militia into service, so Mott not only failed to comply with the
governor’s order, he also did not comply with Madison’s requisition.26 
Mott was later prosecuted in a federal court-martial for his failure to 
muster into the militia and sentenced to a fine.27 When Mott neglected to
pay the assessed fine, a marshal seized his gray farm horse, hence the “old
gray mare” comment under the title of this Article.28 Mott then sued
Martin—the deputy marshal who seized the horse—in a replevin action to
recover the mare, and Martin, the “avowant,” failed in the state courts to
defend his actions.
In a broader sense though, Mott arose as a result of a combination of
an unpopular war; a structural weakness in the Constitution in terms of the 
nation’s ability to defend against an external enemy; and an important, but
now largely abandoned, philosophy critical to the nation’s founding: the 
fear of a standing army. This fear was a crucial element in protecting the
liberty of the new Republic’s white, male citizens and for the preservation
of the Republic itself.29 In April 1814, Jasper Yeates, while serving as a 
justice on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, lamented in his concurring
authority of the good people of this State, doth ordain, determine, and
declare that the militia of this State, at all times hereafter, as well in peace
as in war, shall be armed and disciplined, and in readiness for service.
Id. The state constitution exempted religious Quakers, but as Mott did not claim
his faith as a defense, it should be assumed that he was not a conscientious
objector as a Quaker.
25. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
26. On Tompkins’s authority, see N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII (1877). This article
read: “That the governor shall continue in office three years, and shall, by virtue
of his office, be general and commander in chief of all the militia, and admiral of
the navy of this State.” Id. See Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19; see also JAMES 
MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN
POLITICAL AND LEGAL THOUGHT 266 (1971).
27. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19. The status of the court-martial bears
importance to Mott’s legal history, partly because a New York state court issued
a decision adverse to the executive branch, and partly because the Court did not 
erode the ability of state courts to issue writs against the federal government.
28. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, microformed on U.S. Supreme Court
Records and Briefs, Reel 72 (National Archives). The New York Supreme Court
of Judicature, however, fashioned Mott’s horse as an old “Brown Mare.” Id.
29. Lawrence Delbert Cress, Republican Liberty and National Security:
American Military Policy as an Ideological Problem, 1783-1789, 38 WM. &
MARY Q. 73, 75 (1981).
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168 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
opinion in Duffield v. Smith that court-martial jurisdiction extended over a 
militia soldier who did not muster into service when called to do so.30 
Yeates began his concurrence with, “I cannot reconcile my mind to the
exercise of the powers of courts martial over private citizens, or militia
men, who have not mustered or been in actual service, consistently with
the provisions of the constitution of the United States, or of this
Commonwealth,” underscoring that such an extension of military 
jurisdiction might lead to “wanton oppression.”31 Put another way, Yeates
articulated a fear that the greater the numbers of citizens amenable to the
control of a commander in chief, the likelier the danger to individual
liberties for the whole citizen population. And he implied that a normal
trial by one’s peers—rather than a court-martial—would be the better
course to preserve liberty. However, because Duffield had pled guilty, the
jurisdictional issue was not before the state supreme court. Although this
Article centers on Mott, it should not be missed that Yeates was familiar
with the use of the militia in the early Republic and had been a member of
Pennsylvania’s convention to vote in favor of the federal constitution.32 
This Article is divided into five parts. The first three parts give context
to Mott by providing the legal and political realities in which the Court
addressed the appeal. By the time the Court took up Martin’s appeal, the
30. Duffield v. Smith, 6 Binn. 302, 306 (Pa. 1814) (Yeates, J., concurring).
Story, in his Commentaries on Vol. III, wrote that the constitutionality of the 1795
Militia Act has not been questioned, but this is an overstatement as Justice Yeates
did, in fact, question the validity of subjecting a delinquent militia soldier to a 
court-martial prior to the soldier actually mustering into service. See 3 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 88–89
(1833).
31. Dufffield, 6 Binn. at 306. However, in Duffield, Yeates noted that no
oppression occurred because the defendant had pled guilty and ceded the question
of jurisdiction. Id. Under Pennsylvania law, the doctrine of waiver would have
applied to Duffield in regard to not preserving an objection to be tried by a jury
of his peers, subject to a grand jury. See Commonwealth v. Franklin, 4 U.S. 316
(1804). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, “In criminal cases, too it is a rule,
that errors in form shall be taken advantage of as soon as is reasonable after they
occur, or a waiver of the advantage shall be inferred.” Id. at 317.
32. For a biography of Yeates, see Charles I. Landis, Jasper Yeates and His
Times, 46 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 199 (1922). Yeates became a member
of the bar prior to the Revolutionary War, took an oath and supported the 
Revolution, and then was appointed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1791.
Most importantly, he was a member of the state convention to ratify the United
States Constitution. Id. at 214. In 1794, President Washington appointed him to
lead a commission to encourage the leaders of the Whiskey Rebellion to reconcile 
with the federal government. Id. at 217.
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1692021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
nation had both entered and exited the so-called “Era of Good Feelings”;
the Federalist Party was gone, and only one national political party
remained; and the sectionalism that characterized the war was being
replaced by a nascent sectionalism over slavery.33 When the Court decided
Mott, the war was quite distant from the political and social realities of
1827. The first three parts incorporate original source material from the
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), including
military reports from the Third Military District as well as the original case 
files from Martin v. Mott.34 
Part I briefly details the Constitution’s militia structure as well as the 
War of 1812’s political, economic, and military character. It includes the
standing army fears of the Constitution’s framers.35 Within the analysis of
the militia’s legal construct, particular attention is paid to Federalist No. 
29.36 Part II examines the judicial treatment of the war in appeals both at
the state and federal courts, including Houston v. Moore, an 1820 Supreme
Court opinion arising out of a challenge to state court-martial 
jurisdiction.37 Unlike Jacob Mott, who challenged a president’s authority,
Robert Houston, the aggrieved petitioner in the 1820 appeal, challenged
the authority of Pennsylvania’s legislature and governor.38 
Part III further expands on opposition to the war as well as the
condition of New York’s militia. Part IV provides a brief biographic
comment on the justices who served on the Court at the time of Mott. This 
Part also analyzes Mott based on the context of the War of 1812 and the
courts. It should be noted that unlike the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Houston, New York’s Supreme Court of Judicature did not print its
decision, and the Supreme Court took review of an unpublished decision.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Judicature did not specify any individual
basis—that is, which of the 19 objections Mott raised in the replevin
33. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE
IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 101-114 (1995).
34. The case file for Martin v. Mott is located at (No. 1286), microformed on 
U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, Reel 72 (National Archives). For the
purpose of identifying frame numbers, “F-M-xx” is used. The case file for
Houston v. Moore is located at (No. 881). For the purpose of identifying frame
numbers, “F-H-xx” is used.
35. In addition to the works cited below, on the standing army fears, see
generally Hasan Bashir & Phillip W. Gray, Arms of the Republic: Republicanism 
and Militia Reforms During the Constitutional Convention and the First Federal
Congress 1787–91, 36 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 310, 314–17 (2015).
36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton).
37. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1 (1820).
38. Id.; see also MCCLELLAN, supra note 26, at 268.
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170 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
action—when it sided with Mott. Finally, Part IV concludes with a short
traverse of opinions that have followed Mott, both by direct citation and in 
spirit, and provides a summation that Mott itself should not be used outside
of a narrow arena of law: the authority of a president to issue lawful orders
to persons already in the armed services.
Before proceeding, there are three matters essential for framing Mott’s
history and its historic limitations. First, any analysis of presidential
authority must include, if not begin with, the Constitution’s plain text.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 empowers Congress to “make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”39 By the time 
of the War of 1812, Congress had narrowly limited court-martial 
jurisdiction under the Articles of War to regular army soldiers.40 In other
words, Congress had confined the authority of the army to prosecute 
common law crimes in courts-martial to crimes that had occurred outside
of the states.41 As a result, courts-martial were practically limited to 
prosecuting military offenses such as desertion or failure to follow orders,
but not crimes such as premeditated murder.42 And, as noted below, federal
courts-martial were subject to habeas review by state judiciaries.
Second, the Constitution grants Congress the authority to limit
predicate conditions for calling the militias into federal service.43 These
conditions were limited to the execution of the federal laws, the
suppression of insurrections, and the repelling of invasions.44 While the
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
40. Joseph W. Bishop, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Military-Civilian
Hybrids: Retired Regulars, Reservists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L.
REV. 317, 321–22 (1964). The term “regular” meant those soldiers who were
enrolled into the standing army in peacetime, and not the thousands of state militia 
forces that could be called upon to join the army in a national emergency. On the
distinction between “regulars” and Militia, see Robert Reindeers, Militia and
Public Order in Nineteenth Century America, 11 J. AM. STUD. 81, 82–85 (1977).
41. Robert D. Duke & Howard S. Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing
Army: Another Problem of Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13 VAND. L. REV. 435,
445 (1960). For the operation of the subject matter limitation under the law, see
Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 9 (1921) (permitting the court-martial prosecution
of a soldier for murder prior to the formal end of hostilities with Germany, but
noting the existence of the limitation), and WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW
AND PRECEDENTS 666–67 (2d ed. 1920).
42. Duke & Vogel, supra note 41, at 445.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
44. Id. The clause specifically reads: “The Congress shall have Power . . . To
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions.” Id. One viable argument is that the Militia 
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1712021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
Constitution authorized Congress to “provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining the Militia,” it also left to state governments the authority to
appoint officers and authorize militia training.45 A state citizen called into
militia service who refused or failed to muster into the service was not
guilty of desertion, but rather, a crime of delinquency.46 Desertion in 
wartime was punishable by death.47 The failure to muster was punishable
by a fine and, if the accused soldier were unable to pay the fine, a term in
prison.48 
Finally, in Wise v. Withers, the Court determined that the army’s court-
martial jurisdiction extended only to soldiers who were enrolled in the
federal army or statutorily liable for militia service.49 In 1792, in regard to
the District of Columbia, Congress exempted judicial officers, members
of Congress, and certain executive branch officers from militia service.50 
Peter Wise, as a justice of the peace, was considered exempt under this
law.51 After a militia officer entered Wise’s house and seized his property
as a punishment for a failure to muster, Wise sued the militia officer for
trespass and prevailed at trial, as well as on appeal to the Supreme Court.52 
Clause was an intentional signaling of executive impotence even in crisis times. See
Saikrishna Prakash, The Imbecilic Executive, 99 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1394 (2013).
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16
46. See, e.g., WINTHROP, supra note 41, at 96.
47. Id. at 636.
48. See, e.g., Antrim’s Case, 1 F. Cas. 1062, 1063 (E.D. Penn. 1863) (No.
495) (noting that prior to 1863, a militia soldier who failed to muster was subject
to a fine).
49. Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. 331 (1806). There is little mention of Peter Wise 
in the decision. However, President Thomas Jefferson appointed Wise to the
position in 1801, and unlike William Marbury, who was nominated by the
outgoing President John Adams, Wise was confirmed by the Senate to the position
and had his commission delivered to him. See Charles S. Bundy, A History of the
Office of Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia, 5 RECS. COLUM. HIST.
SOC’Y 259, 282 (1902).
50. Wise, 7 U.S. 331.
51. Id. 
52. Id. In Brush v. Bogardus, New York’s Supreme Court of Judicature
indicated that statutory exemptions from militia duty were to be read very
narrowly in favor of the government. 8 Johns. 157 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). Bogardus
was a merchant sailor on a “coastal vessel” and claimed that Congress, in
exempting “all mariners actually employed in the sea-service of any citizen or
merchant, within the United States; and all persons who now are, or may hereafter
be exempted by the laws of the respective States,” rendered him exempt from
militia service. Id. at 157 (internal citation omitted). New York’s justices
determined, however, that a sloop involved “in the coasting trade” was not a part
of the sea-service. Id. at 159.
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172 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
It is not directly evident that the brief opinion, as authored by Chief Justice
John Marshall, was premised on a fear of standing armies, but it is clear
that the decision curtailed military jurisdiction to only those citizens who
were in the military, or owed an obligation to militia service when lawfully
ordered to do so.
I. THE MILITIA AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF MILITARY CONFLICT
Professor Gordon Wood, a preeminent scholar of early United States
history, coined the War of 1812 as “the Strangest war in American
History.”53 Professor Wood’s characterization is partly premised on the
fact that the United States Army had less than 7,000 “regular troops,” and
yet President Madison was confident that the American force could defeat
the considerably larger, battle-tested British Army.54 Madison’s
assuredness, for several reasons, was grossly misplaced. Britain had been
at war since the end of the 18th century against Napoleonic France and its
allies.55 In 1801, Britain sent 18,000 soldiers to Egypt to dislodge
Napoleon’s forces, proving that it was capable of transiting a large force
to overseas locations.56 Additionally, Britain retained control over Canada, 
which would become a base of operations. Although Britain possessed a
militia system that helped to create an army of 237,000 soldiers, by 1812,
these soldiers, based on drill, discipline, and foreign battlefield experience,
could be classified as “regulars,” and they were a formidable force, albeit
one focused on Napoleon.57 The United States possessed no military forces
that equaled the British Army.
On top of the military’s unpreparedness to wage war, the United
States’ population and political leadership were hardly aligned on the
decision to go to war. As a general observation on the popularity, or lack
thereof, for the 1812 war with Britain, northeastern Federalists who were
reliant on overseas trade with Britain for their economic success opposed
53. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 658 (2009); see also DAVID J. BARON, WAGING WAR:
THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND CONGRESS, 1776 TO ISIS, at 84 (2016).
Baron characterizes the war as “eminently avoidable.” Id.
54. WOOD, supra note 53, at 658.
55. DAVID ANDRESS, THE SAVAGE STORM: BRITAIN ON THE BRINK IN THE
AGE OF NAPOLEON 1–3 (2012).
56. RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, THE AGE OF BATTLES: THE QUEST FOR DECISIVE
WARFARE FROM BREITENFELD TO WATERLOO 337 (1991).
57. Id. at 412.
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1732021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
going to war.58 The Federalists also distrusted alignment with Napoleonic 
France and believed the French Revolution’s ideology posed a greater
danger to the Republic than Britain.59 Political opposition to war has
existed throughout United States history, but the partisan rancor in 1812
was unique, and not only so because the United States was actually
invaded. For instance, opposition to President Polk’s decision to wage war
against Mexico existed in both the Democratic and Whig parties.60 In the 
Civil War, there were pro-Union Democrats.61 In World War I, opposition 
to the war crossed party lines, and the congressional vote to declare war in
1941 was bipartisan.62 So too was there bipartisan agreement in support of
President Harry Truman’s sending of forces into the Korean War.63 Even 
in 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had overwhelming bipartisan
support.64 But to one of the two predominate political ideologies in 1812, 
the decision to fight Britain was a gross error against the national interest.
A. Fears of a Standing Army and Federalist No. 29
The United States was not only hampered by a small standing army,
but also by an overarching philosophy of a fear of a standing army
58. See, e.g., Donald R. Hickey, Federalist Party Unity and the War of 1812, 
12 J. AM. STUD. 23, 25–28 (1978); John E. Talmadge, Georgia’s Federalist Press
and the War of 1812, 19 J.S. HIST. 488 (1953).
59. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Peskin, Conspiratorial Anglophobia and the War
of 1812, 98 J. AM. HIST. 647, 647–48 (2011).
60. See, e.g., K. JACK BAUER, THE MEXICAN WAR: 1846-1848, at 66–81 
(1974); Eric Foner, The Wilmot Proviso Revisited, 56 J. AM. HIST. 262, 275–76 
(1969). Professor Sean Wilentz noted that “along with the War of 1812 and the
Vietnam intervention, the war against Mexico generated more dissent than any
major military conflict in U.S. history,” but unlike the War of 1812 and Vietnam,
the Mexican War resulted in a stunning military victory. SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 602–03 (2005).
61. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
116 (rev. ed. 1919).
62. See JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, TO RAISE AND DISCIPLINE AN ARMY:
MAJOR GENERAL ENOCH CROWDER, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S OFFICE
AND THE REALIGNMENT OF CIVIL AND MILITARY RELATIONS IN WORLD WAR I, at
26 (2017).
63. See, e.g., LARRY BLOMSTEDT, TRUMAN, CONGRESS, AND KOREA: THE 
POLITICS OF AMERICA’S FIRST UNDECLARED WAR 30–31 (2016).
64. See, e.g., Mark Souva & David Rohde, Elite Opinion Differences and
Partisanship in Congressional Foreign Policy, 1975–1996, 60 POL. RSCH. Q. 113 
(2007).
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174 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
becoming destructive to the democratic institutions of government.65 
Professor Richard Kohn, in his Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the
Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802, observed
that “no principle of government was more widely understood or more
completely accepted by the generation of Americans that established the
United States than the danger of a standing army in peacetime.”66 As late
as 1829, none other than military icon and former general President
Andrew Jackson in his first inaugural address stressed that “standing
armies” were “dangerous to free government in time of peace.”67 Even at
the beginning of the twentieth century, the standing army fears remained
a part of the political and legal landscape.68 
The standing army fear was rooted in seventeenth century Britain, and
at the time of the Constitution, it contributed to three salient features of the
United States defense.69 The first was that the small standing army’s
existence was reliant on biannual congressional funding, and the laws
governing the army’s discipline were congressional in origin, rather than
purely executive.70 In his charge to the jury on the libel case of Thomas
Cooper in 1800, Justice Samuel Chase insisted that because of the biannual
funding requirement, the United States could not be considered to possess
65. See, e.g., REGINALD C. STUART, CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING 
THE WAR OF 1812, at 23–24 (2009); Earl F. Martin, America’s Anti-Standing
Army Tradition and the Separate Community Doctrine, 76 MISS. L.J. 135, 145– 
147 (2006). Delegate Edmund Randolph noted at the Virginia ratifying
convention, “there was not a member of the federal convention who did not feel
indignation” at the idea of a standing army. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 401 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1901).
66. RICHARD KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE
CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783–1802, at 2
(1975). Kohn further observed that “a standing army represented the ultimate in
uncontrolled and uncontrollable power,” and that any nation that maintained
permanent forces surely risked the overthrow of legitimate government and the
introduction of tyranny and despotism. Id.
67. Andrew Jackson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1829), in JAMES D.
RICHARDSON, 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENT 437–38 (1867).
68. KASTENBERG, supra note 62, at 26.
69. On the standing army fears in Britain, see E. SAMUEL, AN HISTORICAL
ACCOUNT OF THE BRITISH ARMY AND OF THE LAW MILITARY AS DECLARED BY
THE ANCIENT AND MODERN STATUTES AND ARTICLES OF WAR 134 (1816);
THEODORE ROPP, WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 77–80 (rev. ed. 1962).
70. See, e.g., Act of September 29, 1789, 1 Stat. 96; Act of April 30, 1790, 1
Stat. 121.
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1752021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
a standing army.71 The second feature, the 1806 Articles of War—the body
of military law at the time of Mott’s court-martial—may have been
Thomas Jefferson’s and John Quincy Adams’s creation, but the Articles
did not become law until Congress enacted them.72 The third feature was 
that even when the various state militias were brought into federal service,
the primary disciplinary mechanism to punish errant soldiers—the federal
court-martial—had a significant jurisdictional constraint. No militia
soldier could be court-martialed with regular army officers sitting in
judgment as “jurors.”73 Rather, militia soldiers could be court-martialed 
with only militia officers deciding guilt or a sentence.74 
The term “standing army” may, for the purpose of this Article, be
interchanged with the concept of a professional army. Although the
Roman Empire possessed professional armies—in the sense that its
legions often consisted of career soldiers and officers—from 400 AD until
the early seventeenth century, European military forces were officered by
aristocrats, and the rank and file were an ill-disciplined and unreliable
mixture of peasant levees and mercenary forces.75 Put another way, from
the fall of Rome through the Renaissance, Europe’s myriad of armed
forces often resembled uncontrollable mobs that terrorized civilian
populations but were incapable of cohesion on a battlefield.76 But in the
late sixteenth century in the Netherlands, and then during the Thirty-Years 
War (1618–1648) in Sweden, disciplined armies were formed that drew
71. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865).
On the trial of Thomas Cooper, see Forrest K. Lehman, “Seditious Libel” on
Trial, Political Dissent on the Record: “An Account of the Trial of Thomas
Cooper” as Campaign Literature, 132 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 117, 126– 
131 (2008).
72. 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 338 (C.F. Adams ed., 1874).
73. BREN HALLET, DECLARING WAR: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND
WHAT THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT SAY 31 (2012).
74. Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, § 6, 1 Stat. 424. This section of the Militia
Act reads: “And be it further enacted, that courts martial for the trial of militia 
shall be composed of militia officers only.” Id. § 6. That this act had significance
in the early republic can been adduced from the Court’s opinion in McClaughry
v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 (1902). In Deming, the Court held that volunteers were
not a part of the regular army, and therefore as a matter of statutory interpretation,
officers serving on a court-martial had to come from the state militias or the 
volunteers rather than the regular army. Id. at 69–70. The term “juror” was not
used to describe the officers serving on a court-martial; in military law the term
“member” was used. See, WINTHROP, supra note 41, at 205.
75. See, e.g., WEIGLEY, supra note 56, at 3–5. 
76. John A. Mears, The Emergence of the Standing Professional Army in
Seventeenth-Century Europe, 50 SOC. SCI. Q. 106, 106–08 (1969).
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176 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
much of their soldiery from the population and were professionalized
through a long tenure of service that included drill, an austere military
disciplinary system, and fealty to a sovereign.77 In the 1631 Battle of
Breitenfeld, Sweden’s forces practically maneuvered as a single body and
concentrated their firepower to devastating effect against a larger Catholic
army that had conquered almost all of Northern Europe up to the Baltic.78 
By the American Revolution, Britain had possessed a small standing army,
designed on the Swedish model, for over a half century.79 British soldiers
were subject to a rigorous disciplinary code predicated on loyalty to a
monarch and lengthy service.80 
Following the Seven Years War (1756–1763), several leading
colonists, as evidenced by surviving pamphlets, were upset that Britain
had retreated from its use of a colonial militia in favor of the permanent
army, the “Redcoats,” to police society both in Britain and in the
colonies.81 One scholar has posited that in the colonies, “it became a tenet
of faith” that colonial authorities retain jurisdiction over their militia.82 
Once the colonies achieved independence, the nation’s pre-constitutional
leadership, including Washington, did not depart from the concept of a
militia-centered national defense, but a few sought a small standing army
to be dependent on Congress for its existence.83 Alexander Hamilton, the
author of Federalist No. 29, was instrumental in the creation of the nation’s
new military establishment.84 
In writing Federalist No. 29, Hamilton struck a balance between the
Republican ideals of localized, state control over militia and the means for
assuring that the militia could be called into federal service should the need
77. Id. at 108–10.
78. Id.
79. WEIGLEY, supra note 56, at 79–81; see also VICTORIA HENSHAW,
SCOTLAND AND THE BRITISH ARMY, 1700-1750: DEFENDING THE UNION 30–33 
(2014); HANS DELBRUCK, THE DAWN OF MODERN WARFARE 186–92 (1985)
(noting that Oliver Cromwell, rather than the monarchy, was instrumental in the
construction of a professional British Army with an austere military code).
80. ROGER B. MANNING, AN APPRENTICESHIP IN ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF THE
BRITISH ARMY 1585-1702, at 208–18 (2006).
81. Don Higgenbotham, The Federalized Militia Debate: A Neglected Aspect
of Second Amendment Scholarship, 55 WM. & MARY Q. 39, 40–41 (1998).
82. Id.
83. See Bashir & Gray, supra note 35, at 318.
84. See Edward Meade Earle, Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich
List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power 230–38, in MAKERS OF 
MODERN STRATEGY: FROM MACHIAVELLI TO THE NUCLEAR AGE (Peter Paret ed.,
1986) [hereinafter MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY].
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1772021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
arise.85 The beginning of Federalist No. 29 recognized that a trained militia 
was a necessity to the national defense.86 To achieve this end, Congress
would be responsible for arming, disciplining, and setting the standards of
drill and training for the state militia.87 However, the states selected the
officers who would command the militia.88 In regard to the militia not
being a part of the military establishment that the public feared—the
standing army—Hamilton urged that in trusting the militia, the citizenry 
would be trusting their sons and neighbors.89 But while Federalist No. 29 
provides a reason for public faith in the militia, it is silent as to the
disciplinary instruments that would be used against militia soldiers, except
that Congress would have the authority to proscribe the legal instruments
of discipline.90 
The reason the government had to rely on militia in 1812, even in the
deepest moments of crisis, had to do with the war’s proximity to the
nation’s founding. Several of Madison’s own Republican allies who
supported the war with Britain remained wedded to a fear of a standing
professional federal army. Professor Wood observed that even though the
Republicans knew the nation’s armed forces were wholly unready for war,
they nonetheless feared the threat of a domestic standing army more than
85. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty, Structuralism and the War Powers: The 
Army, Navy, and Militia Clauses, 19 GA. ST. L. REV. 1021, 1029 (2003).
86. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton). The tract, in pertinent
part, states: 
It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the
organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with the 
most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the
public defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp
and of the field with mutual intelligence and concert an advantage of
peculiar moment in the operations of an army; and it would fit them
much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions




89. Id. The document states: 
Where in the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not
trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What 
shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily mingling with
the rest of their countrymen and who participate with them in the same 
feelings, sentiments, habits and interests?
Id.
90. Id.
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178 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
a British invasion.91 For instance, Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin 
noted that the war would have to be fought without “the evils inseparable
from it,” including “military establishments.”92 
B. The Militia in the Early Republic: Expeditionary Incompetence and 
Policing
A century ago, Professor William Ganoe, a military historian and
retired army officer, commented that in 1812, the United States “found
itself with . . . nothing that might be mistaken for trained forces.”93 
Ganoe’s statement is well-supported by the militia’s failures. In 1790, an
expedition under the command of General Josiah Harmer was defeated by
a Miami-led tribal confederation after the poorly equipped Kentucky and
Pennsylvania militia retreated, some without firing their weapons.94 In
1792, the House of Representatives investigated the failure of General
Arthur St. Clair’s expedition against Native American tribes in Indiana.95 
In its report, the House specifically pinpointed that at a critical point before
the expedition’s defeat, Kentucky’s militia deserted.96 Expanding on
Ganoe, Frederick Bernays Wiener, one of the nation’s leading military law 
scholars of his generation, opined in December 1940 that “the problem of
making the militia clause into a workable instrument of national defense 
has not been one of broad vision or constructive imagination, but a task of
avoidance and evasion.”97 
The disasters that befell Harmar and St. Clair were predictable because
the militias had proven problematic even before the colonies broke from
Britain. The colonial militia was, as Professor Kohn concluded, “not a
91. WOOD, supra note 53, at 671. There is a consensus of historians who
agree with Wood on this point. See, e.g., C. EDWARD SKEEN, CITIZEN SOLDIERS
IN THE WAR OF 1812, at 3 (1999); WILENTZ, supra note 60, at 165.
92. Letter from Henry Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 10, 1812), in
HENRY ADAMS, THE LIFE OF HENRY GALLATIN 455–56 (1879).
93. WILLIAM GANOE, THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 116–117 
(1924).
94. THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE
TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 94 (1988).
95. On the defeat of St. Clair, see Leroy V. Eid, American Indian Military 
Leadership: St. Clair’s 1791 Defeat, 57 J. MIL. HIST. 71 (1993).
96. See, e.g., UNITED STATES CONGRESS HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE,
CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION AGAINST THE INDIANS, IN 1791,
UNDER THE COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ST. CLAIR (1793). 
97. Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 
HARV. L. REV. 181, 182 (1940).
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1792021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
system at all.”98 He noted that English military officers and government
officials complained about the colonial militia’s poor training, high 
desertion rates, unwillingness to serve at all, and legal constraints against
serving outside of a colony’s borders.99 During the Revolutionary War, 
General George Washington had a low opinion of the colonial militia.100 
While the concept of militia forces was important to the defense of the
colonies and critical in the formation of the United States, the individual
state militias were a weak match against the professional European armies
that had formed out of a sixteenth century revolution in military affairs.101 
Put another way, citizens in a state militia, who at best were game hunters,
were unlikely to succeed against an army that had been professionally
drilled and trained for war, been cowed by an austere disciplinary system,
and regularly experienced the horror of war.102 Nonetheless, the militia
system at the United States’ beginning, including its weaknesses, was
intentional in design.
In 1792, Congress passed two Militia Acts. The first act, which
became law on May 2, 1792, authorized the president to order the militia
into federal service to repel a foreign invasion.103 The May 2 act also 
permitted the president to order the militia into federal control “whenever
the laws of the United States shall be opposed or the execution thereof
98. KOHN, supra note 66, at 7.
99. Id.
100. DON HIGGINBOTHAM, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE AMERICAN 
MILITARY TRADITION 10–12 (1985). Higginbotham explained, “Militia training
had always fluctuated between being haphazard and nonexistent. As an
organization the militia could hardly be effective when it included almost all free
white males and when officers owed their appointments to their political and
social standing.” Id. at 12.
101. John Shy, New Look at the Colonial Militia, in JOHN SHY, A PEOPLE
NUMEROUS & ARMED: REFLECTIONS ON THE MILITARY STRUGGLE FOR
INDEPENDENCE 29–42 (1992). The distinction between professional military and
militia emerged in the late Middle Ages. WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, THE PURSUIT OF
POWER 206–208 (1982). Of the many works on the seventeenth century and the
growth of professional armies, see Gunther E. Rothenberg, Maurice of Nassau,
Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the “Military Revolution” of
the Seventeenth Century, in MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY, supra note 84, at
32–63.
102. George J. Neimanis, Militia vs. The Standing Army in the History of 
Economic Thought from Adam Smith to Friedrich Engels, 44 J. MIL. AFF. 28–32 
(1980). On the making of the Seventeenth Century Prussian Army, see R.R.
Palmer, Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War, in
MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY, supra note 84, at 68–98.
103. Militia Act of 2 May 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1903).
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180 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
obstructed, in any state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the
marshals by this act.”104 This act initially proved unpopular as the Senate
had introduced a version that enabled a president to call up the militia to 
defeat an insurrection, and the House of Representatives, perhaps mindful
of the fear of military authority residing solely in the executive, added the 
qualifier that a federal court would have to first decide an insurrection
existed.105 This meant that a federal judge would have to agree with an 
executive determination that an insurrection existed of a magnitude
necessitating the militia’s federalization. Additionally, the May 2 act had
a “sunset” provision in that it expired after three years.106 The second
Militia Act, passed on May 8, 1792, enabled the conscription of all white
males between the ages of 18 and 45 into the state militias.107 
Three years later, on February 28, 1795, Congress, at the request of
President Washington, passed another militia act, which gave greater
power for a president to call the state militias into service in that there was
no “sunset” provision and the judicial certification requirement was 
removed.108 Although Thomas Jefferson had been reticent to create a 
standing army at the time of the Constitution’s drafting, after his 
presidency, he noted to Madison in 1813 that the state militias were,
without further training and discipline, nothing more than a crowd.109 
On April 18, 1814, in the midst of the war, Congress passed “an Act,
in addition to the Act, entitled ‘An Act for Calling forth the militia to
execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions,
and to repeal the act now in force for those purposes.’”110 The act of April
18 reaffirmed that courts-martial of militia soldiers could only be
composed of militia officers and had to be conducted under the Articles of
War.111 This requirement existed regardless of whether the militia 
104. Id.
105. KOHN, supra note 66, at 134. On the unpopularity of this act, including
opposition by its initial sponsor, see Wiener, supra note 97, at 187.
106. KOHN, supra note 66, at 134.
107. Militia Act of 8 May 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (repealed 1903).
108. Compare Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 424, with Militia Act of
2 May 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264. On Washington’s involvement, see, for
example, EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 161 (3d ed.
1948).
109. Robert L. Kerby, The Militia System and the State Militias in the War of 
1812, 73 IND. MAG. HIST. 102, 115 (1977).
110. THIRTEENTH CONGRESS, PUBLIC STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 134 (RICHARD PETERS ed., 1850).
111. Id. § 1.
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1812021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
campaigned in conjunction with the regular army or on its own.112 But, in 
an addition to the 1795 law that it augmented, the 1814 act also specifically
mandated the prosecution of delinquents in courts-martial.113 However, 
under the Act, the term “delinquent” only applied to citizens called into
militia service after a presidential summons to duty.114 In short, the 1814 
law created courts-martial under federal law when a militia soldier failed
to comply with a presidential order. But a state could conduct its own 
courts-martial under state law if a soldier became a delinquent under
federal law, either when the militia soldier was already in federal service
or when the president, independent of a governor, had ordered the militia
to come into federal service. In a somewhat confusing scenario, a state
court-martial and a federal court-martial might have the same officers
sitting in judgment of an accused soldier, but the state court-martial would
operate under state law rather than the Articles of War.
There is a final point to make on the laws governing the militia and
the issue of state review. The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause might
appear to vitiate the possibility of a state trial judge or court of appeal from
issuing a writ of habeas against a federal officer who had a militia soldier
or a regular army soldier in custody.115 After all, in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, the Court determined that a state had no authority to tax a
federal institution, because if it did, the state could usurp the power of
Congress, elevating the state over the federal government.116 But in a very
broad interpretation of the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, state judges
issued habeas writs on federal officials to free militia soldiers as well as
regular army soldiers from confinements imposed by federal courts-
martial.117 When Mott came to the Court, neither Justice Story nor any 
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. § 3.
115. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, which reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
116. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
117. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cushing, 11 Mass. 67 (1814); Rathbun v.
Martin, 20 Johns. 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823); State v. Dimick, 12 N.H. 194 (1841);
Ex parte Anderson, 16 Iowa 595 (1864); see also Eric M. Freedman, The 
Suspension Clause in the Ratification Debates, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 451, 452 (1996)
(noting that while the Suspension Clause may have originally enabled state habeas
review of persons held in federal custody, in the middle of the nineteenth century,
the Court rejected this idea with “vigor”).
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182 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
other justice appeared concerned with a legal system in which a state court
could encroach into the commander in chief’s authority to fully maintain
a military. Perhaps because the Mott Court was close in time to the
Constitution’s creation, there was an understanding, as Professor
Saikrishna Prakash has articulated, that the presidency was intentionally
subject to structural weaknesses rendering it “imbecilic,” even in crisis 
times; it was acceptable that a state court might issue a habeas writ against
a military commander holding an alleged spy in custody.118 
II. THE WAR OF 1812 AND THE MILITIA AS A LEGAL TEST OF THE
NATIONAL WILL
According to Professor John Whiteclay Chambers, when the United
States finally went to war with Britain in 1812, James Madison’s
Democratic-Republican administration demonstrated the difficulty of
mobilizing a governmentally weak and regionally divided country for a
major war.119 Aside from large-scale political opposition to the war in the
Northeastern United States, calls for militia service disrupted the
agricultural economy of the country and were particularly hard on smaller
farms. Thus, it is possible that Jacob E. Mott, the centerpiece of the Court’s
opinion, is placeable into the category of a citizen who believed he had to
choose between financial loss and serving in a war, instead of a citizen
morally opposed to the war.120 Furthermore, one year prior to the conflict,
Governor Tompkins penned to a friend that New York’s militia had a
delinquency problem.121 In short, it was unsurprising that from the start of
the conflict, state militia forces did not uniformly rush to the nation’s
defense, and even those that did proved problematic. Some militia units
refused to serve under federal command, and others argued that their
118. Prakash, supra note 44, at 1399.
119. JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS, TO RAISE AN ARMY: THE DRAFT COMES 
TO MODERN AMERICA 32 (1987).
120. See RICHARD V. BARBUTO, NEW YORK’S WAR OF 1812: POLITICS,
SOCIETY, AND COMBAT 153 (2021) (noting that Congress foreclosed the ability to
sell wheat to Canada) [hereinafter BARBUTO, NEW YORK’S WAR OF 1812]; 
Brooke Hunter, Wheat, War, and the American Economy During the Age of
Revolution, 62 WM. & MARY. Q. 505, 526 (2005) (noting that wheat farmers had
an improved economy because of export to Europe during the Napoleonic wars
but that this improvement could have been jeopardized by a war with Britain).
121. Letter from Daniel Tomkins to William Paulding (Dec. 30, 1811), in 2 
PUBLIC PAPERS OF DANIEL D. TOMPKINS, 1807-1817, at 390 (1902).
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1832021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
militia status necessitated a refusal to participate in a military invasion into
Canada.122 
When, as noted below, New York’s governor called the state militia
into service in 1814, hundreds if not thousands of men refused to comply.
The governor’s actions were not only predicated on Madison’s requisition
of militia forces, but they also occurred in response to a threatened British
invasion from Canada.123 In the first two years of the war, much of
Britain’s military might was focused on fighting Napoleon. In the summer
of 1814, some of Britain’s hardened soldiers, who had spent years fighting
the French in Spain, Egypt, and other areas, were shipped to Canada, and
this force represented the gravest threat to the United States.124 Almost
contemporaneously, a British raid into Chesapeake Bay resulted in the
brief capture and arson of Washington, D.C.125 Writing about his 
experiences with the New York militia, with almost 45 years to ponder
them, General Winfield Scott characterized militia soldiers as “vermin
who no sooner found themselves in sight of the enemy than they
discovered that . . . [they] could not be constitutionally marched into a
foreign country.”126 
The militia had, to an extent, been reliable in suppressing insurrections
in the Early Republic, but there were danger signs for Madison in
launching the country into an unpopular war. On March 7, 1799, a
Pennsylvania citizen named John Fries led a group of armed citizens
dressed in French revolutionary garb to force the release of fellow citizens
jailed for refusing to comply with a national tax.127 In theory, some, if not
all, of the men involved in the rebellion who disclaimed the federal tax law
could be called into the militia.128 A greater danger to the Constitution
122. Samuel J. Watson, James Monroe and American Military Policy: A
Lifetime of Connection and Growing Advocacy for a Standing Army, 128 VA.
MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 2, 17 (2000).
123. Harvey Strum, New York Militia and the Opposition to the War of 1812, 
101 N.Y. HIST. 114–32 (2020).
124. ROBERT S. QUIMBY, THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WAR OF 1812, at 
505–06, 655 (1997).
125. Id. at 690–99.
126. WINFIELD SCOTT, 1 MEMOIRS OF LIEUT.-GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT 63 
(1864).
127. Paul Douglas Newman, The Federalists’ Cold War: The Fries Rebellion,
National Security, and the State, 1790–1800 67 PA. HIST. 63, 67–68 (2000).
128. See PA. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1790), which reads:
The freemen of this commonwealth shall be armed and disciplined for
its defence. Those who conscientiously scruple to bear arms, shall not be 
compelled to do so; but shall pay an equivalent for personal service. The
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184 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
occurred in the Whiskey Rebellion (1791–1794), in which citizens
protested a federal tax on manufacturing distilled spirits and thwarted
federal attempts to collect the tax with threats of violence.129 After 
Supreme Court Justice James Wilson certified that an insurrection existed
beyond the control of the courts, President Washington ordered 15,000
militia to come under federal control and suppress the rebellion.130 Not 
only was Pennsylvania’s governor reluctant to use his state’s militia to
suppress the uprising, some of the men participating in the insurrection
were amenable to militia service.131 
In 1809, the Court issued United States v. Peters, informing the
Pennsylvania legislature and governor that a state government could not
unilaterally annul the decision of a United States District Court judge.132 
Arising out of a long-standing admiralty claim that began prior to the
adoption of the Constitution, a mariner named Gideon Olmstead prevailed
over Pennsylvania. But the state governor, Simon Snyder—a member of
Madison’s own party—refused to pay and ordered the state militia to
prevent a United States marshal from serving the Court’s writ.133 The
militia’s commander and eight of his soldiers were prosecuted in federal
court, but Madison desired peace between the federal government and the
states, if not within his own party, and pardoned the nine militia soldiers.134 
militia officers shall be appointed in such manner, and for such time, as 
shall be directed by law.
129. WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: GEORGE 
WASHINGTON, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE FRONTIER REBELS WHO 
CHALLENGED AMERICA’S NEWFOUND SOVEREIGNTY 67–70 (2006); Bennett M.
Rich, Washington and the Whiskey Insurrection, 65 PA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 334, 335 (1941).
130. Richard H. Kohn, The Washington Administration’s Decision to Crush
the Whiskey Rebellion, 59 J. AM. HIST. 567, 579 (1972).
131. Id.
132. United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. 115 (1809). It is noteworthy that Chief
Justice Marshal, in authoring the opinion, emplaced into it the following: 
If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments
of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under
those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery; and
the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by the 
instrumentality of its own tribunals.
Id. at 136.
133. WILENTZ, supra note 60, at 140. For a more detailed background on the
Olmstead affair, see Kenneth W. Tracey, The Olmstead Case, 1778–1809, 10 W.
POL. Q. 675 (1957); Gary D. Rowe, Constitutionalism in the Streets, 78 S. CAL.
L. Rev. 401, 410 (2005).
134. WILENTZ, supra note 60, at 140.
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1852021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
A. The War of 1812 and Its Opponents
Professor Wood’s observation that the War of 1812 was “the
strangest” in American History is appropriate for several reasons. With the
prodding of Speaker of the House Henry Clay in early June 1812, Madison
sought a declaration of war from Congress.135 On June 18, the Senate voted 
to declare war 19–3 and the House 79–49.136 This was hardly a unanimous
legislative mandate for war, and Madison’s own Democratic-Republican
Party had congressional defectors.137 Indeed, a number of northern 
“malcontent” Republicans believed that Madison’s and Jefferson’s foreign
policies opposing Britain favored the South.138 Professor Sean Wilentz 
points out, in his magisterial The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson
to Lincoln, that Madison’s presidency did not unify his party, which had 
split between an older generation willing to work with the Federalists and
a younger generation geared for war with Britain.139 For a variety of
reasons ranging from commercial interests to religious opposition,
Northeastern Federalists uniformly voted against going to war.140 The 
election of 1812—Madison’s reelection campaign—was a referendum on
the war in which De Witt Clinton, his Federalist-Democratic-Republican
fusion opponent, carried New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
135. See, e.g., MICHAEL BESCHLOSS, PRESIDENTS OF WAR: THE EPIC STORY,
FROM 1807 TO MODERN TIMES 61 (2019).
136. See, e.g., Jasper M. Trautsch, “Mr. Madison’s War” or the Dynamic of 
Early American Nationalism? 10 EARLY AM. STUD. 630, 659 (2012); J.C.A.
STAGG, THE WAR OF 1812: CONFLICT FOR A CONTINENT 18 (2012).
137. DONALD HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812: A SHORT HISTORY 16–17 (2012);
ROBERT REMINI, HENRY CLAY: STATESMAN FOR THE UNION 92–93 (1991)
[hereinafter REMINI, HENRY CLAY].
138. J.C.A. Stagg, James Madison and the “Malcontents”: The Political
Origins of the War of 1812, 33 WM. & MARY Q. 557, 561 (1976).
139. WILENTZ, supra note 60, at 156. For reviews of Wilentz’s book, see
Gordon S. Wood, Book Review: The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to
Lincoln, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2005 (“nothing less than monumental”). The term
“magisterial” denotes that Wilentz’s book earned the 2006 Bancroft Award as
being the leading scholarly work in American History. For a counter-view, see
Michael Holt, Reviewed Work: The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to
Lincoln by Sean Wilentz, 93 J. AM. HIST. 491 (2006) (lauding Wilentz’s research
but taking exception to a number of misinterpreted events).
140. Lawrence Delbert Cress, “Cool and Serious Reflection”: Federalist 
Attitudes toward War in 1812, 7 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 123, 123–27 (1987); KEVIN
R.C. GUTZMAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA 316–18 (2012).
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186 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, Massachusetts, and a part of
Maryland.141 
Not all of the opposition to Madison translated to opposition to the
war, and some of it simply arose as a matter of constitutional interpretation
regarding the limits of the militia. Earlier in January 1812, Congress voted
to increase the size of the regular army from 10,000 to 35,000 soldiers and
to add an additional 50,000 volunteers to serve short-term enlistments in
the federal army, with the possibility of calling 100,000 militia into federal
service for a six-month period should the need arise.142 However, as “war
clouds loomed,” there was dissension in Congress over the name “militia
of the United States,” and both Federalist and Republican legislators
insisted that the name would be “the militia of the several states until called
into the Service of the United States.” 143 
Shortly after the declaration of war against Britain, the War
Department ordered an invasion into Canada.144 American forces
numbered between 5,000 and 6,000 on the Canadian border in New York,
but 2,600 of the soldiers were part of New York’s militia. Commanded by
General Stephen Van Rennselaer, a New Yorker of substantial means,
New York’s militiamen faced a British force of 1,500 soldiers.145 
Hundreds of militia soldiers insisted that they were prohibited from
fighting the British in Canada and refused to invade, leaving the regular
army to be defeated by the British.146 Whether the militia soldiers opposed
the war on the basis of political ideology or viewed themselves as
constitutionally constrained is difficult to know, but because of large-scale
opposition to the war, particularly in the northern states, mass refusals to
serve can be suspected as being influenced by political ideology.
The war went badly for the first two years. If Madison and the war’s
supporters believed that because Britain was in a life-or-death struggle
with Napoleon, a successful invasion of Canada and defeat of Britain were 
141. Phillip J. Lampi, The Federalist Party Resurgence, 1808-1816: Evidence
from the New Nation Votes Database, 33 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 255, 265–66 (2013).
142. Act of 11 January 1812, Cong. 12, sess. 1, ch. 14, § 16; see also WOOD,
supra note 53, at 672; WESLEY TURNER, BRITISH GENERALS IN THE WAR OF 1812:
HIGH COMMAND IN THE CANADAS 4–5 (1999); REMINI, HENRY CLAY, supra note
137, at 84–89.
143. 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 1004 (1812).
144. See David Druzec, Failure at Queenstown Heights: The Politics of 
Citizenship and Federal Power During the War of 1812, 94 N.Y. HIST. 205, 209
(2013).
145. ALAN PESKIN, WINFIELD SCOTT AND THE PROFESSION OF ARMS 23–26 
(2003).
146. SKEEN, supra note 91, at 97–99.
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1872021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
likely, they were mistaken. The invasion of Canada failed on August 16, 
1812, when British forces took the offensive and captured Fort Detroit in
the Michigan Territory.147 General William Hull, an aged veteran of the 
Revolutionary War, surrendered his forces to the British, which led to
Hull’s court-martial and death sentence.148 In Eastern Canada, another
American invasion was defeated by the British in October at the Battle of
Queenstown Heights outside of Ontario.149 The Royal Navy blockaded
Chesapeake Bay as well as ports in the Southern United States. Although
there were minor American victories, at the end of 1813, the British
captured Fort Niagara.
By the beginning of 1814, the United States’ war effort became so
disjointed and worrisome that Congress considered creating a national
conscription program, but opponents of conscription, led by
Representative Daniel Webster, successfully prevented it from becoming
law.150 Webster and his allies insisted that conscription was
unconstitutional and that an enlarged standing army, as opposed to a 
militia, would enable the creation of a dictatorship.151 Writing two decades
after the war, Theodore Dwight, a former Federalist member of Congress,
insisted that Secretary of War James Monroe’s call for a national
conscription program was an attempt to create a despotic power that would
erode the constitutional guarantees of a limited government, and this was
a factor leading up to the Hartford Convention—a Federalist response to
the War.152 In June, British forces occupied parts of northern Maine, and 
on August 31, Governor General George Prevost, in command of 10,000
British soldiers, began an invasion of New York.153 In July 1814, 
American forces fought the British to a standstill at “Lundy’s Lane” but
withdrew from the area around Niagara, leaving New York open to an
invasion.154 In August, the British briefly captured Washington, D.C., and
had control of a part of Massachusetts, which later became Maine.155 At
147. Id.
148. DONALD HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812: A FORGOTTEN CONFLICT 82–83 
(2012) [hereinafter HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812].
149. Id.
150. ROBERT REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE MAN AND HIS TIME 127–29 
(1997).
151. Id.
152. THEODORE DWIGHT, HISTORY OF THE HARTFORD CONVENTION: WITH A
REVIEW OF THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WHICH LED TO THE 
WAR OF 1812, at 323–24 (1833).
153. Id. at 201.
154. Id. at 189.
155. WILENTZ, supra note 60, at 161.
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188 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
the end of 1814, the United States Government was almost bankrupt and
the Treasury Department defaulted on the national debt by suspending
specie payments.156 
Military defeats were one matter for Madison to contend with as
commander in chief. The factionalism within the United States did not
dissipate during the war. When the war began, Massachusetts Governor
Caleb Strong called “for sympathy with the nation in which we are 
descended.”157 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in an advisory
opinion, issued a document of legal hostility to the war.158 In essence, the
state’s justices advised that it was the governor’s authority to determine
whether an emergency existed sufficient to call forth the militia.159 The 
Mott Court would address this very point and answer in opposition. Along 
with Strong, the governors of Connecticut and Rhode Island refused to
comply with militia requisition orders from the federal government or to
permit their militia forces to leave their states.160 Federalists dominated all
three of the state governments.
Federalist disgust with the war led to a convention in Hartford,
Connecticut, in December 1815 in which secession from the United States
was discussed.161 While the convention resulted in the downfall of the
Federalist Party, because by the time of its conclusion, peace had been
achieved with Britain, it did come as a shock to the federal government
that three state governments had discussed amending the Constitution,
issuing a demand that Madison resign from office, and seeking a separate
peace with Britain.162 But peace with Britain and a resounding military
victory over the British in New Orleans resulted in the end of a Federalist
rebirth.163 
156. HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812, supra note 148, at 231–33.
157. Id. at 162.
158. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND
EXECUTIVE, OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, MILITARY AFFAIRS 323,
324; A Letter from the Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to the 
Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, with the answer of the Justices, 8 Mass.
548 (1812).
159. Id.
160. HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812, supra note 148, at 265; Donald Hickey, New 
England’s Defense Problem and the Genesis of the Hartford Convention, 50 NEW 
ENG. Q. 587, 590 (1977) [hereinafter Hickey, New England’s Defense Problem].
161. WILENTZ, supra note 60, at 164–65.
162. See Hickey, New England’s Defense Problem, supra note 160, at 600– 
04; Matthew Mason, “Nothing is Better Calculated to Excite Divisions”:
Federalist Agitation Against Slave Representation During the War of 1812, 75
NEW ENG. Q. 531, 545 (2002); Cress, supra note 140, at 123–27.
163. WILENTZ, supra note 60, at 165–74.
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1892021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
B. The Condition of the New York Militia
By the time Martin’s appeal was decided, the New York authority
most responsible for his court-martial had served as New York’s governor
and then Vice President of the United States for eight years. Born in
Scarsdale, New York, in 1774, Daniel D. Tompkins attended Columbia
University, practiced as lawyer, and served as a justice on New York’s
Supreme Judicial Court.164 In 1807, Tompkins defeated fellow
Democratic-Republican Morgan Lewis to become New York’s fourth
governor.165 Tompkins had also earlier helped draft the state’s 
constitution, including its militia laws.166 One historian has noted that in 
defeating Lewis, Tompkins presaged Andrew Jackson as a politician who
understood the importance of appearing as “one of the people.”167 
However, in 1808, the state senate elections resulted in a Federalist victory
over the Republicans, presenting a split government.168 In 1812, the 
Federalists prevailed once more in the legislative elections specifically
because of opposition to war with Britain, but by the end of 1813, the
Republicans had regained control of the legislature.169 This voting pattern
reveals to the modern scholar that there was political dissension against
the war, which manifested in the state’s politics but that the state’s voters 
had flexible views on the war, if for no other reason than that the electorate, 
between 1807 and 1813, thrice elected Tompkins.
There is perhaps a small irony that the general who convened Mott’s
court-martial, Morgan Lewis, was an “old-line” or “aristocrat” Republican
who had earlier defeated Aaron Burr in the race for governor and also was
a political opponent of both Tompkins and Madison.170 Born in New York
City in 1754, Lewis attended Princeton University in 1773, studied law
164. Gaspare J. Saladino, Daniel D. Tompkins, in VICE PRESIDENTS: A
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 52, 55–56 (L. Edward Purcell ed., 3d ed. 1998).
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Robert V. Remini, New York and the Presidential Election of
1816, 31 N.Y. HIST. 308, 310 (1950).
167. Harvey Strum, Property Qualifications and Voting Behavior in New 
York, 1807-1916, 1 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 347, 348 (1981).
168. Id. at 351.
169. Id. at 354.
170. Id. at 350–54. One historian has described the lack of cohesion in New
York’s pre-War of 1812 Republican party as “primarily a coalition of family
factions, which tended to fracture repeatedly along the lines of its component
parts.” See Michael Wallace, Changing Concepts of Party in the United States: 
New York, 1815-1828, 74 AM. HIST. REV. 453, 456 (1968).
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190 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
under John Jay, and took up arms against Britain in 1775.171 One year later,
he was promoted to the rank of colonel and commanded militia forces
against Britain at the Battle of Ticonderoga.172 Following the United
States’ independence from Britain, Lewis served in the New York
Assembly and as a state supreme court judge, state attorney general,
governor, and United States senator.173 In 1813, Tompkins commissioned 
Lewis as a major general of the state militia.174 Shortly thereafter, Madison
appointed Lewis as commander of the Third Military District, an area
comprising New York and New Jersey.175 According to one military 
historian, by the War of 1812, Lewis was “old by the standards of the day”
and “feeble.”176 
Lewis spent much of 1813 in Sag Harbor on Lake Ontario, preparing 
defenses against a possible British invasion from Canada.177 Early in his 
command, Lewis was constrained by the state judiciary. On July 21, 1813,
a commissioner of the Supreme Court of Judicature ordered Lewis and a
naval officer to produce Samuel Stacy, a suspected spy.178 When Lewis
demurred, Chief Justice James Kent scolded Lewis for his “insufficient”
if not contemptuous response to the commissioner and reminded the
general that the military was not above the law.179 “If ever a case called
for the most prompt interposition of the court to enforce obedience to its
process, this is one,” Kent concluded. “A military commander is here
assuming criminal jurisdiction over a private citizen, is holding him in the
closest confinement, and contemning the civil authority of the State.”180 
171. See BARBUTO, NEW YORK’S WAR OF 1812, supra note 120, at 10; see also




174. 2 JULIA DELAFIELD, BIOGRAPHIES OF FRANCIS LEWIS AND MORGAN 
LEWIS 83 (1877).
175. 2 R.S. GUERNSEY, NEW YORK CITY AND VICINITY IN THE WAR OF 1812,
at 90 (1895). Lewis had served in several campaigns prior to his appointment. 
176. QUIMBY, supra note 124, at 310.
177. Gary M. Gibson, Militia, Mud, and Misery: Sacketts Harbor During the
War of 1812, 94 N.Y. HIST. 241 (2013).
178. In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
179. Id. at 334.
180. Id. It should be noted that even if Lewis wanted to ignore Justice Kent, 
he was thwarted from doing so, as both Secretary of War Armstrong and President
Madison agreed with Kent. See, e.g., Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The President’s Power
to Detain Enemy Combatants: Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison’s Forgotten
War, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1567, 1583 (2004).
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1912021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
Shortly after Lewis assumed command, he convened a court-martial 
against three deserters, which resulted in guilty verdicts and death
sentences.181 The public executions of two of the three soldiers did not
have the deterrent effect that Lewis had hoped for, as desertions continued
to plague his force.182 On July 28, 1814, he requested that Tompkins order
citizens into the militia and to proceed north to Sag Harbor after perceiving
a growing threat from Canada.183 One month later, on August 29, Lewis 
implored Tompkins to order militia into service for the defense of New
York City as well.184 
Lewis’s consternation over the condition of New York should be
studied against the conduct of the state militia during the war. On March
24, 1814, the Adjutant General of the Third District—the senior officer
responsible for conveying War Department orders—reported to Tompkins
that nine officers would be placed on permanent duty at Governor’s Island
in New York City to sit as a semi-permanent, or “standing,” court-martial
for the purpose of trying deserters and delinquents.185 The next day, the
adjutant general detailed a memorandum for the standing court-martial.186 
The memorandum reminded the officers assigned to the duty of finding
soldiers guilty or not guilty of failing to report to duty or desertion that the
181. Gibson, supra note 177, at 241. Professor Gibson noted that two of the 
three soldiers were executed by hanging and one soldier was given a reprieve.
182. Id.
183. Letter from Morgan Lewis to Daniel Tompkins (July 28, 1814) (on file 
with the National Archives). Lewis’s correspondence stated:
The President has determined that the militia in service at Sag Harbor
shall be continued for six months under the Act of the 18 April last.
About fifty of them have, since this determination, insisted that in the
ranks of the corps have become much thinned from other causes. I must 
therefore request your Excellency to order an immediate draft from the
militia.
184. Letter from Morgan Lewis to Daniel Tompkins (Aug. 29, 1814) (on file
with the National Archives). Lewis’s correspondence stated:
Believing that the City of New York is menaced with invasion, and that
the surest means of averting such a calamity is to be prepared for it, I
take the liberty of calling on your excellency for an additional military
force to consist of nine thousand four hundred and fifty Infantry and one
thousand and fifty Artillerists of which latter as large a proportion as 
possible should be of light artillery, a squadron of horse would also be
desirable.
185. Adjutant General Report to Daniel Tompkins (Mar. 24, 1814) (on file
with the National Archives).
186. Adjutant General Report to Daniel Tompkins (Mar. 25, 1814) (on file
with the National Archives).
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192 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
evidence against each soldier had to be reflected “in a distinct specification
of the respective charges.”187 In other words, while the standing court-
martial could assess the guilt or innocence of dozens if not hundreds of
soldiers, each accused soldier had to be assessed by the trial as an
individual and not be found guilty en masse. Yet militia soldiers were
court-martialed en masse.
As early as April 1814, the Third Military District’s militia forces were
depleted well below their normal strength. For instance, one of the
companies in Mott’s regiment only had two of its four officers present for
duty, one of four sergeants, and only 61 of the 100 privates accounted
for.188 Thirteen privates were absent from duty and, of the others, several
were already deemed as military prisoners.189 By the end of July, one 
company could only account for 52 of its 100 privates and another counted
as present only 55 of its 100 privates.190 On April 28, 1814, the adjutant
general recorded that in one day on Governor’s Island, 14 privates were
found guilty of failing to muster.191 Perhaps most surprisingly, the court-
martial determined that “the unfortunate men incurred the penalty of
death.”192 The court-martial also decided that a Sergeant Whitlock was
likewise found guilty but recommended leniency, and in conformance
with this recommendation, Morgan pardoned him.193 
The standing court-martial continued to address desertions and 
failures to muster throughout the summer of 1815. On July 3, 1814, the
adjutant general recorded over 30 desertion cases from the prior day.194 
Typical of this reporting was the case of John Barrow, where an entry
reads, “private in the company of the 41st Regiment – Charge and
specification of desertion, pleaded ‘guilty,’” and the court-martial 
confirmed the plea of the prisoner and sentenced him “to be shot to 
death.”195 Likewise, William Jones, a private in the Corps of Artillery, pled 
187. Id.
188. Company Returns for July 30 Received by the Inspector General of the
Third Military District (on file with the National Archives).
189. Id.
190. Id. 
191. Id. These privates were Matthew Caldwell, James Kerwin, James
McClary, William Hutson, James Van Glout, John Chamberlain, Daniel Perry,
John Cadogan, John Harper Montgomery, John Hicks, John Martin, George King,
Samuel Carter, and Walter Clark. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Adjutant General Report to Daniel Tompkins (July 3, 1814) (on file with
the National Archives).
195. Id.
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1932021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
“not guilty” but was found guilty and sentenced “to be shot to death.”196 
Perhaps reflecting the seriousness of the numbers of desertions and
failures to muster, Private McCortland was found guilty of being drunk on
duty and asleep at his post and sentenced to 15 days of solitary
confinement. Another private named George Homister was convicted of
using abusive language toward his superior officers but was only 
sentenced to be fed bread and water for 30 days as well as to forfeit half
of his pay.197 In all, over 40 soldiers were prosecuted on July 3 before a
single court-martial.
On July 29, the standing court-martial listed 39 militia soldiers
convicted of either desertion or failure-to-muster offenses. While six of
the soldiers were sentenced to be “shot to death,” most of the others—such 
as John Brown—were sentenced to hard labor for six months and a
forfeiture of half pay during the duration of the sentence.198 On the other
hand, the entry for Thomas Brown of the “41st Regiment of Infantry”
notates an acquittal, which is the first such notation for 1814.199 Yet, on 
August 3, the court-martial, in addition to determining that over a dozen
soldiers were guilty of desertion, sentenced John Williams, “private in 32
Infantry,” to “be hung by the neck until dead” for deserting his post.200 The
same court-martial determined that the appropriate penalty for Jacob
Sanders, a private in the 42nd Infantry who impersonated an officer, was
to be confined for same amount of time as his impersonation.201 
On September 24, 1814, Lewis ordered a new standing general court-
martial to prosecute all citizens who failed to muster into militia duty.202 
A review of the Third Military District’s records, specifically the inspector
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Adjutant General Report to Daniel Tompkins (July 29, 1814) (on file with
the National Archives). 
199. Id.
200. Adjutant General Report to Daniel Tompkins (Aug 3, 1814) (on file with
the National Archives). 
201. Id.
202. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827). The court-martial order
applicable to Mott as enumerated in the Court’s opinion reads:
Adjutant General’s Office, 3d M. D. New-York, 24th September, 1814.
General Orders. A General Court Martial, under the act of Congress of
the 28th of February, 1795, for the trial of those of the militia of the State
of New-York, ordered into the service of the United States, in the third
military district, who have failed to rendezvous pursuant to orders, will 
convene on Monday, the 26th instant, at Harmony Hall, and will consist 
of the following members. . . .
Id.
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194 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
general’s orderly books, now located in the United States National
Archives and Records Administration in Washington, D.C., evidence that
Mott was hardly alone as a “delinquent,” and certainly the numbers of
deserters alone attest to a mass depletion in the ranks. On October 2, 1814,
the standing court-martial determined that 41 militia soldiers had deserted.
None of the sentences resulted in a death penalty. Some, such as Nathaniel
Field, were merely sentenced to be discharged with a loss of pay and a
fine.203 Others, such as John Yeoman, were sentenced to “hard labor” and 
a “stoppage of whiskey and half pay.”204 There is another primary source
for determining the effect of delinquents on the militia’s ability to fight.
The Records of the U.S. Army Commands, Third Military District’s
Company Returns evidence that during the period January 1 to December
31, 1814, no company—the basic military formation of roughly 40 to 100
soldiers—was close to full strength.205 Mott’s company, which appears to 
be typical, listed that 17 privates were absent and unaccounted for while
48 were present for duty. One of the two lieutenants was in prison as were
three privates.206 
During this time, it was clear that New York was in crisis as an
invasion from Canada briefly materialized. On August 31, Brigadier
General Mound informed Tompkins that the northern city of Clinton, New
York, had fallen to the British and that General Macomb had ordered him
to call out the local militia in its entirety.207 On September 1, Macomb
reported to Tompkins that Lewis had, in fact, ordered the militia north and
his forces were proceeding to Lake Champlain in the hopes of repulsing
the British.208 Five days later, Tompkins learned that Plattsburgh had also
fallen to the British.209 But at the end of the month, New York’s and the
203. Adjutant General Report to Daniel Tompkins (July 29, 1814) (on file with
the National Archives).
204. Id.
205. Company Returns Received by the Inspector General (1814) (on file with
the National Archives).
206. Id.
207. Letter from Brig. Gen Mound to Daniel Tompkins (Aug. 31, 1814) (on 
file with the National Archives).
208. Letter from Alexander Macomb to Daniel Tompkins (Sept. 1, 1814) (on
file with the National Archives). Macomb’s letter evidences desperation: 
The Army has advanced in force as far as the Village of Champlain and
is now encamped on the north side of the Churzy River in number of
about five-thousand under the command of Lieut. Col. Brisban, it is said
they have a much larger force. . . . Every effort is making to receive him.
Major General Morgan has called out the militia en-masse.
209. Letter from Benjamin Mooer to Daniel Tompkins (Sept. 6, 1814) (on file
with the National Archives). Mooer’s letter stated, “I feel it my duty although
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1952021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
nation’s fortunes had turned, and the British began a retreat into Canada.
As one officer noted to Tompkins, “The militia of New York have
redeemed their character, they behaved gallantly. General Davis was killed
and General Porter slightly wounded.”210 
Given the widespread delinquency and desertion, it is not difficult to
fathom why mass courts-martial were ordered. In spite of the widespread 
delinquency, by the end of September, there were 17,000 militia soldiers
activated and defending New York City.211 There were rumors that a
British force of 6,000 soldiers with the support of the Royal Navy were
readying for an invasion of Long Island, though this never materialized.212 
And interestingly, on October 14, 1814, Secretary of War James Monroe
replaced Lewis with Tompkins in command of the Third Military
District.213 Tompkins had no prior military experience, and the move
appears to have been for political reasons.214 Some of Tompkins’s earliest 
actions as the Third Military District’s commanding officer included the
ordering of a standing court-martial, which adjudged several militia
soldiers as guilty of absence without leave.215 
On February 16, 1815, the district’s adjutant general issued a sweeping
court-martial order which dealt with 57 militia soldiers charged with
desertion at Sag Harbor alone.216 All of the militiamen convicted under
this order were sentenced to fines ranging from eight dollars to ninety 
dollars.217 However, in the event that a militia soldier was unable to pay a
fine, they would be considered “delinquent” and be required to “serve in
prison one month for every five dollars of fine imposed.”218 Mott was
listed among the hundreds of delinquents from the Third Military District
as of 1815.219 
painful to give your Excellency the earliest information of the enemy’s entering
Plattsburgh with a large force at about 11 O Clock.” Id.
210. Letter from Jacob Brom to Daniel Tompkins (Sept. 20, 1814) (on file with
the National Archives).
211. QUIMBY, supra note 124, at 725.
212. Id.
213. Id.; see also Letter from James Monroe to Daniel Tompkins (Oct. 14,
1814), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF DANIEL D. TOMPKINS, GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK
699–700 (1898).
214. QUIMBY, supra note 124.
215. PUBLIC PAPERS OF DANIEL D. TOMPKINS, supra note 213, at 708–13.
216. General Orders, Adjutant General Office New York (Feb. 16, 1815) (on
file with the National Archives).
217. Id.
218. Id. In the same court-martial, 29 other militia soldiers were acquitted.
219. List of Deserters, Records of the Adjutant General Third Military District,
(on file with the National Archives).
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196 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
III. COURTS AND SOLDIERS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC THROUGH THE 
WAR OF 1812
In 1815, Chief Justice John Marshall in Meade v. Deputy Marshal
conducted the first federal judicial review of a state militia court-martial 
to arise from the war.220 On March 24, 1813, Virginia’s governor James
Barbour ordered the state militia to muster, and William Meade failed to
comply. In late 1813, a court-martial composed of militia officers
convicted Meade for a delinquency but did so under the Articles of War,
the body of law for the regular army and federalized militia.221 Meade’s 
court-martial predated the Act of April 18, 1814, a point that Marshall
stressed before concluding that, because Virginia had no laws permitting
the trial of delinquents under the Articles of War by court-martial, the state
court-martial did not have jurisdiction.222 Further, Marshall noted that
Meade’s court-martial had proceeded without providing notice to Meade,
and without notice, the court-martial had no jurisdiction.223 Put another
way, military courts, like civilian criminal trials, had to be conducted with
due process or be jurisdictionally forfeit.
Although it is true that in 1810, the Supreme Court of Judicature of
New York determined in Capron v. Austin that courts-martial had to be
220. Meade v. Dep. Marshal, 16 F. Cas. 1291 (C.C.D. Va. 1815) (No. 9,372).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1293.
223. Id. There are only a few citations to Meade. See Richard D. Rosen,
Civilian Courts and the Military Justice System: Collateral Review of Courts-
Martial, 108 MIL. L. REV. 5, 23 (1985). Rosen penned, “[w]ithout articulating any
basis for review, Chief Justice Marshall found that the court-martial had failed to
comply with state law and had proceeded without any notice to the petitioner.”
However, Marshall did obliquely state a standard of review in his analysis on
“notice.” See, for example, Suzanna Sherry, The Founders Unwritten
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1171 n.189 (1987), noting that in Meade: 
Marshall, in invalidating the court-martial relied on three independent
grounds: “(1) in the absence of Congressional delegation, courts martial 
are under federal, not state, control; (2) even if properly under state
control, the court martial acted improperly under Virginia law; and (3)
even if Congressional action had authorized the action (imposing a fine
on a private not actually in service) despite state law, the court had
proceeded without notice. The first two issues were purely statutory.”
However, this is in error as to the first point; courts-martial were never the
exclusive province of the federal government. State constitutions permitted state 
militia to be court-martialed in state trials. See, e.g., People v. Hazard, 4 Hill. 207 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); Rawson v. Brown, 18 Me. 216 (1841). Both Hazard and
Brown arose from state courts-martial.
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1972021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
conducted with the same notice requirements of state criminal trials,
Meade might be the earliest instance in which the federal judiciary
determined that notice was a fundamental right of citizens subject to the
military law regardless of whether that law was federal or state.224 In
addition to understanding Mott in the context of Meade—that is, militia
soldiers were vested with certain due process rights—it is noteworthy that
until 1871, when the Court issued Tarble’s Case, state courts granted
habeas to prisoners held in military custody.225 Following Tarble’s Case, 
only the federal courts possessed the jurisdiction to review courts-martial 
on appeal, and federal review became much narrower than state review.226 
This is not to argue that the state courts sought to undermine the 
federal war effort or became a tool to do so. (Justice Stephen A. Field, in 
authoring Tarble’s Case, insisted that state courts and state governments
undermined the war effort during the Civil War).227 But there were 
important state and federal constitutional-rights challenges to come before
the courts, such as religious faith and accompanying statutory exemptions
from mandatory militia service. For instance, in early 1817, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee issued Durham v. United States, in which the justices
determined that the state court-martial of William Durham—a Quaker— 
had to be quashed because the court-martial ignored the statutory
exemption of Durham from service.228 The Kentucky Supreme Court
issued a similar decision in White v. McBride, in which the justices held
that a court-martial had no jurisdiction over conscientious objectors.229 In
1814, New York’s Supreme Court of Judicature recognized that Quakers
were exempt from militia service, but when an officer relying on a muster
roll—military records of personnel assignments—arrested a citizen for
224. Capron v. Austin, 7 Johns. 96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
225. Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. 397 (1871). On this point, see In re Carlton, 7 
Cow. 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); Rosen, supra note 223, at 26–27; see also Edward
A. Hartnett, The Constitutional Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. REV. 251,
265 (2005) (noting that there is no shortage of scholars who consider Tarble
unsound).
226. See, e.g., In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890); In re Morrisey, 137 U.S.
157 (1890); KASTENBERG, supra note 62, at 55.
227. Tarble, 80 U.S. at 408.
228. Durham v. United States, 5 Tenn. 54 (1817). The Tennessee Attorney
General apparently argued that the federal law did not exempt Durham, and
therefore the court-martial was valid. The state supreme court determined that the 
court-martial was a state function and therefore subject to state law, including
exemptions.
229. White v. McBride, 7 Ky. 61 (1815). Kentucky’s justices found Wise v.
Withers dispositive to this issue.
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198 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
delinquency and the citizen later claimed a religious exemption, the officer
was immune from suit.230 
A. Houston v. Moore: Pennsylvania Precedes Jacob Mott
Professor Wilentz penned that “Pennsylvania saved Madison’s
presidency” in regard to the 1812 election.231 In 1818, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court granted a further review of Duffield’s challenge to the
jurisdiction of a state court-martial, although by this time Justice Jasper
Yeates had died.232 Like Jacob Mott, Edward Duffield sued John Smith, a 
federal marshal, for trespass, assault, and false imprisonment.233 On April
7, 1813, Governor Simon Snyder ordered 1,000 militia men to muster for
inspection in case they were needed to repel a British invasion near the
mouth of the Delaware River.234 President Madison had issued a 
requisition for 14,000 militia men on April 15, 1812, but rescinded it by
the time the governor issued the order for the 1,000 militia men, of which 
Edward Duffield was a part.235 It appears from the state supreme court’s 
decision that Duffield actually neglected to muster twice: once in regard 
to Madison’s requisition in 1812 and again in 1813 in regard to the
governor’s order.236 After being notified of court-martial charges against
him, Duffield “voluntarily, and without any restraint, appeared on the 15th
February 1814, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, not
denying his disobedience of orders, but acknowledging and confessing the
same . . . .”237 This was the very submission to the court-martial that
troubled Yeates four years earlier.
In Duffield v. Smith (II), the state court, in a decision authored by Chief
Justice William Tilghman, determined that because there was no state law
creating a crime for disobedience to the president’s orders, a state court,
including a state militia court-martial convened under the governor’s
230. Vanderbilt v. Downing, 11 Johns. 83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814).
231. WILENTZ, supra note 60, at 158.
232. Duffield v. Smith, 3 Serg. & Rawle 590 (Pa. 1818).
233. Id. Duffield also sued a militia captain and judge advocate. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. Governor Snyder was a proponent of war with Britain and an
enthusiastic backer of Madison. In the words of one historian, “While 
Pennsylvania was not the only state to favor war with Great Britain, few were as
willing to support the war effort in terms of military mobilization.” John. C.
Fredriksen, The Pittsburgh Blues and the War of 1812: The Memoir of Private 
Nathaniel Vernon, 56 PA. HIST. 196 (1989).
236. Duffield, 3 Serg. & Rawle at 591–92.
237. Id.
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1992021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
direct authority, had no jurisdiction over Duffield.238 However, Tilghman 
made it clear that, in his view, if the states were free to determine that the
federal government had no jurisdiction over “delinquents,” the
Constitution would be “a dead letter.”239 Tilghman reasoned that just as it
was a constitutional imperative for the president to have sole discretion to
declare an emergency and the declaration not be subject to interpretation
of state governors, any court-martial which adjudged militia soldiers who 
violated a president’s order had to be adjudged under the Articles of War,
constrained, of course, by the 1795 Militia Act’s safeguard of having
militia soldiers adjudged only by militia officers.240 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision to void Duffield’s court-
martial and enable his trespass suit to proceed against the marshal, militia
captain, and judge advocate is explainable in light of three other decisions.
Chief Justice Marshall’s order in Meade made it clear that due process
existed in courts-martial. In an earlier decision, titled “Bolton,” Justice
Tilghman noted that there was no state law authorizing the court-martial 
of militia soldiers who refused to heed the orders of a president, and
therefore the court-martial had no jurisdiction over that conduct.241 
However, after the state court issued Bolton, Pennsylvania’s legislature
made it a criminal offense to disobey the president. In Houston v. Moore, 
the state’s justices determined that this offense was valid as a state law,
and therefore a state court-martial possessed jurisdiction over such a
refusal.242 Houston, as discussed further below, deserves greater attention 
for its impact on Mott, if not the shaping of the nation’s military law.
A note on Tilghman contextualizes Story’s approach to military law
and executive authority. Born in Maryland in 1756, Tilghman studied law
and was elected as a state legislator. In this capacity, he served as a
delegate to that state’s constitutional convention and voted to ratify the
proposed federal constitution.243 Tilghman moved to Philadelphia shortly
after the United States came into being.244 In 1801 President John Adams
appointed him to the circuit court, and after the circuit was disbanded,
238. Id. at 593.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 595. Tilghman’s decision notably stated: “If the governor had the
direction of the courts-martial, he might find it easy to thwart the views of the
president. When the sentence is given, to whom is it to be submitted for
approbation?”
241. Id. at 598.
242. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
243. See 2 FRANK M. EASTMAN, COURTS AND LAWYERS OF PENNSYLVANIA:
A HISTORY 1623-1923, at 396 (1922).
244. Id.
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200 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Tilghman became the presiding judge for the Pennsylvania Court of 
Common Pleas. Then, in 1806, he became chief justice of the state
supreme court, where he remained until 1827.245 Another point on both 
Tilghman and Houston is important. In 1814 Pennsylvania’s legislature
enacted a law to prevent the obstruction of the national war effort in the
courts.246 The act compelled the collection of fines from delinquents but
provided a safeguard to prevent the double payment of fines.247 The act
also made it a misdemeanor to issue a writ or grant certiorari to remove 
the proceedings or sentences of a federal militia court-martial into state
court.248 
On April 3, 1815, Daniel Moore, a deputy marshal in Pennsylvania,
entered into Robert Houston’s mercantile store and seized a number of
goods in lieu of a $96 fine249 that a state court-martial had assessed against
him for failure to comply with a muster order.250 Houston sought to
challenge the property seizure in a state court, and, in addition to Moore,
he named Molton C. Rogers, General John Dicks, and Nathaniel W.
Sample in his civil suit.251 Rogers had served as judge advocate on 
Moore’s court-martial, and Sample as the inspector general who convened
Houston’s court-martial.252 General John Dicks served as the presiding
officer on the court-martial that fined Houston after finding him guilty.253 
245. Id.; see also HORACE BINNEY, AN EULOGIUM UPON THE HON. WILLIAM
TILGHMAN, LATE CHIEF JUSTICE OF PENNSYLVANIA 7–14 (1827).
246. Act of Assembly of 28th March 1814 (Pa. 1814).
247. Id. § 21.
248. Id. § 25.
249. Moore v. Houston, 3 Serg. & Rawle 169, 170 (Pa. 1817). It might appear
that the items seized, two “broadcloths,” were of a lesser burden to Houston than
the loss of a mare was to Mott. See Moore, 3 Serg. & Rawle at 170, microformed
on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, No. 881, F-21. One other problem
with the seizure of Houston’s property was that as Houston was the co-owner of
a mercantile store, the property seized may have been jointly owned. See “Oath
of Mr. Jacob Gossler,” Id. at F-30.
250. Id. Governor Simon Snyder ordered the Pennsylvania court-martial
convened on December 22, 1814. The court-martial lasted from February 13 until 
February 25, 1815, and prosecuted dozens of citizens liable for failure to comply
with a muster order.
251. Moore, 3 Serg. & Rawle at 170.
252. Id. Rogers would later serve as Pennsylvania’s “Secretary of the
Commonwealth,” in the Pennsylvania Senate as a Democrat, and as an associate
justice on the state supreme court. See Stanley I. Kutler, Pennsylvania Courts, The 
Abolition Act, and Negro Rights, 30 PA. HIST. 14, 23 (1963).
253. In 1776, Dicks was listed as a private in militia company. See 2 WILLIAM
LYNCH MONTGOMERY, PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES 602, 604 (1906). During the
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2012021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
The facts leading to the court-martial were similar to those leading to
Mott’s. Governor Simon Snyder issued a callup of militia on August 26,
1814, and on February 25, 1815, the court-martial found that Houston had
failed to muster into service. Houston pled not guilty, and he objected to 
the jurisdiction of the court-martial.254 He lost on both issues. A civil trial,
however, concluded that Moore did not have the authority to seize
Houston’s property because the court-martial did not possess
jurisdiction.255 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a decision authored by
Tilghman, framed the issue as whether the state legislature had the power
to create state courts-martial for state citizens who failed to muster into the
militia pursuant to a president’s order.256 Tilghman noted that if the
Pennsylvania legislature were to have created courts-martial over their
militia when the militia was already called into federal service without the
governor’s cooperation, then the state court-martial would necessarily run
afoul of the Constitution because it would usurp an exclusive federal
power.257 Yet, if the state legislature were to enact a law authorizing state 
courts-martial jurisdiction over militia prior to the militia being called into
federal service, the court-martial would be valid and indeed be in aid of
Congress’ authority.258 But, of course a state court-martial would maintain
jurisdiction over a citizen called into service by a governor whenever the
call occurred. Tilghman then concluded that the Pennsylvania legislature,
in conferring state court-martial jurisdiction over delinquents, had merely
created a law in aid of the federal government, and therefore the state law 
was not repugnant to the Constitution.259 Justice John Bannister Gibson, 
in his concurrence, appears only to have departed from Tilghman on the
War for Independence, he was promoted to sergeant. On Dicks, see also WILLIAM
P. CLARKE, OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE MILITIA AND THE NATIONAL GUARD OF
THE STATES OF PENNSYLVANIA 181 (1909). John Dicks became the commanding
officer of a brigade in the Fourth Division in 1814.
254. Moore, 3 Serg. & Rawle at 171.
255. Id. at 175.
256. Id. at 177. Tilghman noted that Houston presented a different challenge
than what had been argued in Bolton. That is, in Bolton, the state legislature had
not enacted a law enabling courts-martial to prosecute citizens who failed to
comply with a presidential order to muster.
257. Id. at 178–80. Tilghman stated, “The power of the several states to govern
their own militia is not derived from the constitution of the United States. They
had it before the adoption of that constitution, and possess it still, except where it 
has been restricted, or yielded to the United States.” Id. at 178.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 183.
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202 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
basis of whether a militia soldier who failed to object to the jurisdiction of
the court-martial later waived a challenge on appeal.260 
On May 17, 1817, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its
decision. Less than three years later, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the state supreme court in Houston v. Moore.261 Pennsylvania was 
represented by one of its congressmen, Senator Charles Jared Ingersoll,
along with “M.C. Rogers.”262 This was the same Rogers named in the suit, 
and by the time of the appeal, Rogers had become the Secretary of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.263 Houston cited Meade in arguing to the 
Court that without a specific grant of authority from Congress to the states,
the use of a state court-martial to vindicate the power of a president was
unconstitutional.264 In other words, Houston argued that only the federal
government could court-martial him once the president ordered the militia
into service. Nowhere in the state’s argument was there a claim that a state
judge lacked the authority to issue a habeas writ on a federal officer.
The Court gave its opinion on February 16, 1820, but this is somewhat
misleading because Justice Bushrod Washington earlier issued a ruling in
his circuit-rider capacity, which later became the Court’s opinion.265 
Washington’s ruling limited the appeal to the singular question of whether
Pennsylvania’s legislative act enabling courts-martial of delinquent
citizens when the delinquency occurred in response to a presidential order
260. Id. at 189 (Gibson, J., concurring).
261. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
262. On Ingersoll, see Irwin F. Greenberg, Charles Ingersoll: The Aristocrat 
as Copperhead, 93 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 190, 191 (1969) (noting that
Ingersoll came from a Federalist family but embraced Jeffersonian ideology).
Ingersoll had also served as the state’s attorney general.
263. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1. On Rogers, see GENERAL CATALOGUE OF
THE COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY 118 (1908) (noting that Rogers died in 1863 and
had also served as a justice on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court); see also Molton
Cropper Rogers: Biography, PA. STATE SENATE, https://www.legis.state.pa.us
/cfdocs/legis/BiosHistory/MemBio.cfm?ID=4339&body=S [https://perma.cc/7Z
HD-2PH9].
264. Houston’s brief rhetorically asked the Court and then answered:
Is it possible that Congress meant to give power to a State Court, without
naming the Court, or granting the power in express terms? The exercise 
of this jurisdiction by a State Court Martial would either oust the United
States’ Courts of their jurisdiction, or might subject the alleged
delinquents to be twice tried and punished for the same offence. If the
State Court could try them, the Governor of the State could pardon them
for an offence committed against the laws of the United States.
Moore, 18 U.S. at 3.
265. Id. at 15.
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2032021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
was repugnant to the Constitution.266 In order to answer this question, he
first conducted an overview of the relationship between the state
governments and their militias to the federal government. The
Constitution, he noted, empowered Congress to call the militia into federal
service as well as to organize, arm, and discipline them.267 However, it was
left to the state governments to train and discipline the militia according
to standards set by Congress when not in the federal service. 268 At the time
of the appeal, Congress provided that delinquents were to be tried in
courts-martial staffed by militia only and subject to fines or imprisonment
if the fines were not paid.269 Finally, Washington found it important to note
that in the Act of 8 May 1792, while Congress set forth the qualifications
for militia service and the minimum standards for arming the militia, it
was left to the state legislatures to organize their respective militias into
military units and create disciplinary rules to govern these units.270 To 
Washington, as a result of interlocking authorities, both a state and the
federal government maintained jurisdiction over militia soldiers. Whether
Washington and the other justices approved of this system of governance,
he made it clear that the Court would not deviate from or alter it.271 
Justice William Johnson in his concurrence noted that the issue before 
the Court was difficult to define and expressed uncertainty as to whether
the Court had jurisdiction.272 This was because if Pennsylvania had 
prosecuted Houston under its own laws, it was doubtful that there was a
federal question contained in the appeal.273 Moreover, Houston’s suit was
rooted in a property tort, a matter ordinarily reserved to the states. But
Johnson and the majority of the Court determined that the appeal presented
a question of whether the state had exceeded its jurisdiction and whether
the federal army had exclusive jurisdiction over courts-martial when the
militia were called into service.
Johnson observed that militia soldiers owed duties of fealty to both
their state and the federal government, and therefore they were subject to 
the “coercive regulations of both governments.”274 However, it became a
266. Id.




271. Id. at 15. Washington noted, “This system may not be formed with as 
much wisdom as, in the opinion of some, it might have been, or as time and
experience may hereafter suggest.” 
272. Id. at 32 (Johnson, J., concurring).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 34.
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204 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
matter of timing as to when, if at all, the federal government could exercise
jurisdiction over a militia soldier in that it could not do so until the militia
solider became a part of the federal army when the president or Congress
called the state militia into federal service.275 Whatever the weaknesses in 
this system, Johnson intimated that it was not for the Court to effectuate
any change.276 Put another way, until a president issued a requisition for
militia, the state retained jurisdiction, and this jurisdiction continued until
the emergency passed.277 
As to the argument that if a state possessed an independent military
power, it might use this power against the federal government, and
therefore the states were preempted by the federal government in the realm
of militia discipline, Johnson countered that the Court was not confronted
with such a problem. Instead, Houston’s court-martial occurred while
Pennsylvania was cooperating with the federal government and not
opposed to it.278 Johnson was, however, careful to note that simply because
a state governor was the commanding officer of his militia, this did not
mean that the governors were subordinate to a president.279 
Story dissented from Washington’s opinion and Johnson’s
concurrence on the basis that Houston’s appeal presented only one
question to the Court: whether Pennsylvania’s Act of March 28, 1814, can
make it a crime for a citizen amenable to militia service to fail or refuse a
president’s order to muster.280 Story conceded that the question itself was 
of both “great importance and delicacy.”281 He insisted that once a 
president, following Congress’ grant of authority, called the militia into
federal service, the federal government gained exclusive jurisdiction over
federal military crimes. Thus, once Madison had called forth the militia
into federal service, the state court-martial was repugnant to the
Constitution. If the states were permitted to court-martial their militia once
called into federal service, he warned, then the president would lose
275. Id.
276. Id. at 36.
277. Id. at 37.
But the possession of this power, or even the passing of laws in the
exercise of it, does not preclude the general government from leaning
upon the state authority, if they think proper, for the purpose of calling
the militia into service. They may command or request; and in the case 
before us, they obviously confined themselves to the latter mode.
Id. 
278. Id.
279. Id. at 46.
280. Id. at 48 (Story, J., dissenting).
281. Id.
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2052021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
control over the militia. Governors could pardon offenders, state supreme
courts could overturn convictions, and jeopardy would attach.282 Because
of this, the president would be unable to pardon a soldier convicted in a
state militia and then be deprived of the services of the militia soldier. This
would cause a loss of commander in chief control over the military, and
therefore the state laws were repugnant to the Constitution.283 
Story assured the nation that he did not intend to add to the federal
government “one jot of power” beyond its constitutional authority.284 Yet
that is what his dissent would have accomplished had it been in the
majority, because it would have divested state courts of a potential broad
oversight of courts-martial and removed the power of a governor to pardon
a class of convicted offenders. In her 2019 dissent in Gamble v. United
States, Justice Ruth Ginsburg posited that Story was seeking to protect
citizens, but in reality, this was not the case at all.285 Indeed, Story’s view 
of Houston is encapsulated in his statement on a president being the sole 
arbiter on whether an emergency has arisen: “This question was much
agitated during the late war with Great Britain, although it is well known,
that it had been practically settled by the government, in the year 1794, to
belong exclusively to the president.” 286 
B. New York and Other State Judicial Decisions on Militia in Wartime
During the War of 1812 and its immediate aftermath, state appellate
courts did publish decisions defining the parameters of court-martial
jurisdiction. In Johnson v. Hunt, New York’s Supreme Court of Judicature
determined that a statutory exemption from militia service for mail carriers
did not include a single-time contractor employed to transport military
express mail.287 New York’s state courts-martial not only adjudicated
military crimes, but they could also function as trial courts to resolve
disputes and award damages. In 1813, the New York judiciary decided in
Ferris v. Armstrong that a captain who relied on a muster roll to arrest a
delinquent was absolved of wrongdoing, and therefore the private could
282. Id. at 72–73.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1990–92 (2019) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
286. STORY, supra note 30, at 91–92.
287. Johnson v. Hunt, 13 Johns. 186 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816). One might surmise
from this decision that New York’s appellate judges were reticent to interfere with
the governor’s full commander in chief authority.
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  210 11/19/21  12:01 PM




   
   
  
   
   
  
   
   
    
    
  
   
   
  
 






   
  
   
 
    
   
     
    
  
   
 
    
   
  
     
   
         
       
 
   
206 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
not recover monetary damages for the arrest.288 Private Armstrong had, in
fact, been validly discharged from his regiment at the time of the arrest in
1809. However, the discharge certificate had not been penned into the
muster rolls of his regiment, and therefore it appeared as though he was
delinquent.289 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this decision is that
while the judiciary absolved Captain Ferris of wrongdoing, it maintained
in place a system of accountability that served as a check on military
tyranny. It was not until 1950 that the Court, in Feres v. United States, 
precluded civil lawsuits against military officers as well as against the
military itself in general matters.290 Yet, if the New York judiciary 
maintained the ability to permit lawsuits against militia officers as a check
against tyranny, it also determined in McConnell v. Hampton in 1815 that
judges would have to guard against “unreasonable damages.”291 
While the state’s judges might be called upon to check military
tyranny, the Supreme Court of Judicature, in Schuneman v. Diblee, 
determined that once a militia soldier was lawfully convicted in a court-
martial, the judiciary had to be reticent to permit suits against officers on
the basis of prison conditions.292 The facts that gave rise to Schuneman
included a small-scale mutiny in which several militia soldiers refused to
comply with a colonel’s orders and were sentenced by a lawfully
constituted court-martial to prison.293 As there were no available soldiers
to serve as guards, the commanding officer determined that all of the
available soldiers were needed to guard the fort.294 As a result, one soldier
awaiting court-martial was “tied” to a cannon at the fort after refusing to
do military duties.295 A civil trial found in favor of the soldier over the
officer, but the justices reversed this finding and award on the basis that a
288. Ferris v. Armstrong, 10 Johns. 100 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
289. Id.
290. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Feres arose from three
medical malpractice claims, not allegations of abuse of authority. Id. at 137. The
Court noted, “The relationship between the Government and members of its
armed forces is ‘distinctively federal in character.’” Id. at 143 (citing to United 
States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947)).
291. McConnell v. Hampton, 12 Johns. 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815). In
McConnell, however, the lawsuit arose from a civilian who may have been falsely
accused of working for the British and imprisoned. Id. at 236.
292. Schuneman v. Diblee, 14 Johns. 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817).
293. Id.
294. Id. Also known as Fort Gansvort, this structure was a part of Manhattan’s
fortification system. See BARBUTO, NEW YORK’S WAR OF 1812, supra note 120,
at 26.
295. Schuneman, 14 Johns. 235.
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2072021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
soldier who was otherwise required to do military duties could not prevail
in a civil court after he refused to do such duties.296 
In 1815, the Supreme Court of Judicature, in Smith v. Shaw, upheld a
civil action against a military officer who detained a citizen accused of
being a spy during the threatened British invasion months earlier.297 The
defendant officer argued that because martial law had been imposed at the
time of the arrest, the detention was lawful. However, Judge Smith
Thompson—later appointed to the Supreme Court by President James
Monroe—determined that because Smith, as a civilian, was not amendable
to court-martial jurisdiction, he was wrongly detained by the military.
Therefore, the trespass action against Shaw was lawful.298 Judge
Thompson’s conclusory statement in upholding the action against Smith
was illustrative of a fear of military tyranny. Even though he conceded that
Shaw’s actions did not appear “harsh and oppressive,” Thompson
observed that “[i]f the defendant was justifiable in doing what he did,
every citizen of the United States would, in time of war, be equally 
exposed to a like exercise of military power and authority.”299 Yet 
Thompson also authored Hampton, in which he cautioned that unjust
enrichment was not a means to curb tyrannical military authority.
Prior to the Court determining Martin’s appeal, the Supreme Court of
Judicature issued three decisions on court-martial jurisdiction over
militiamen who refused to muster into duty. In Vanderheyden v. Young, 
the New York Supreme Court of Judicature determined that the law solely
vested a president with the determination of declaring an emergency.300 
Like Mott, the appeal arose in Vanderheyden as a result of a citizen who
refused to muster into duty, was convicted in a court-martial, and then filed
a civil suit to recover property seized by a marshal.301 Vanderheyden
argued that the marshal had a burden of proving that there was an
emergency of a nature that it was necessary for a president to declare an
emergency.302 Authored by Justice Ambrose Spencer, the state’s appellate
judges responded that to “countenance such a construction of the Act
would be monstrous” because militia officers and martials would cease
doing their duty to order citizens into their respective militia units or to
296. Id.
297. Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815).
298. Id. at 266.
299. Judge Thompson prefaced his statement with the caveat, “The conduct of
the defendant in this case does not appear to have been harsh and oppressive. But
it is the principle involved in it, which renders the question important.” Id.
300. Vanderheyden v. Young, 11 Johns. 150 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814).
301. Id. at 158.
302. Id.
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208 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
conduct courts-martial for fear that they would be subject to civil
actions.303 However, because it appeared that Vanderheyden was no longer
subject to court-martial jurisdiction, as he had been mustered out of the
militia, the seizure of his property was unlawful.304 Vanderheyden
occurred in an ongoing conflict, but it was to prove influential in two other
New York decisions.
In 1821, the Supreme Court of Judicature determined in Mills v.
Martin that because a court-martial was a court of limited jurisdiction, the
party seeking justice under the Articles of War had to prove to the court-
martial that it possessed jurisdiction over a militia soldier, even when the
party was the state.305 But there was a more stunning aspect to the decision.
Justice Jonas Platt,306 in authoring the decision, determined that a state
citizen called into the militia could not be amenable to federal military
jurisdiction until the militia soldier swore an oath and accepted federal
pay.307 Two years later, in Rathbun v. Martin, the Supreme Court of
Judicature determined once more that a militia soldier who refused to
muster into federal service was not amenable to an army court-martial.308 
Like in Mott, the appeal arose as a challenge to the state’s replevin action
against Rathbun and two other militia soldiers, Robert S. Livingston and
J. F. Bartlett.309 
IV. MARTIN V. MOTT
The Marshall Court, as named for its Chief Justice John Marshall,
began with his appointment to the Court in 1801 by President John
Adams.310 Although a detailed biography of each justice would necessarily
deter from a study of Mott and create an enlarged word count, it is helpful
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Mills v. Martin, 18 Johns. 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821).
306. Prior to his judicial service, Platt served in Congress and was a Federalist.
See, e.g., JOHN STILLWELL JENKINS, HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE
STATE OF NEW-YORK 169 (1846). Platt was also a general in the state militia and
had unsuccessfully sought the governor’s office in 1810.
307. Id. at 22. Although it may have been “stunning” for its time, by World
War II, the national draft laws did not permit the extension of court-martial 
jurisdiction over citizens who refused to comply with an induction order, and such
jurisdiction only began after the citizen swore an oath and accepted pay. See, e.g., 
Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 548–49 (1944).
308. Rathbun v. Martin, 20 Johns. 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823).
309. Id. at 344.
310. George L. Haskins, Law and Politics in the Early Years of the Marshall
Court, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1981).
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2092021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
to acknowledge that by 1827, the justices appointed by the two Federalist
presidents were Marshall and Washington.311 There is a historic consensus
that Marshall was a “giant” in terms of shaping the nation’s laws.312 From
1811 until his death in 1829, Washington, a nephew of President
Washington, was the senior associate justice on the Court.313 He has been
referred to as a friend and ally of both Marshall and Story, but has been
called “insignificant” in the development of the nation’s laws.314 Another
of the justices, Gabriel Duvall was the “most insignificant of justices.”315 
Because Mott was issued on February 7, 1827, but had been at the Court
for the prior two years, it is difficult to know whether Thomas Todd, who
left the court in 1826, or Robert Trimble, who succeeded him, had a role
in the shaping of the opinion.316 The record of the proceedings is bereft of
any evidence of either taking part. But before delving into the traverse of
the appeal through its decision, it is important to comment on Justice 
Joseph Story, the author of the opinion, and Justice Smith Thompson, who
had served on New York’s Supreme Court of Judicature and participated
in New York’s state constitutional convention.
311. Herbert A. Johnson, Bushrod Washington, 62 VAND. L. REV. 449, 451 
(2009).
312. See, e.g., R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF
THE SUPREME COURT xvi (2007); JOHN SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS
JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL, AND THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED
STATES 294–301 (2012); Michael Gerhardt, The Lives of John Marshall, 43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1399 (2002).
313. Johnson, supra note 311, at 458–59.
314. David A. Faber, Justice Bushrod Washington and the Age of Discovery 
in American Law, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 725, 737 (2000) (seeking to correct this
characterization).
315. David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 466, 469-69 (1983) (“To encumber the highest bench for a
quarter of a century without leaving any deeper imprint than Duvall did is the
mark of a very special judge.”).
316. Thomas Todd has also been suggested for the mantle of “most
insignificant justice.” See G. Edward White, Neglected Justices: Discounting for
History, 62 VAND. L. REV. 319, 320 (2009). However, Todd was entrusted to
author several of the Court’s “western land cases,” which had a political
importance at the time, and Todd’s son served on General William Henry
Harrison’s staff during the War of 1812. See Thomas Todd, Letters of Thomas
Todd of Kentucky to his son at college, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 20 (1913).
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210 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
A. Biographic Note: Story and Thompson
In the midst of the War of 1812, Story dissented in Brown v. United
States in which the majority held that, even in wartime, a president could
not constitutionally seize a British citizen’s property without a specific 
legislative authorization to do so.317 In United States v. Bainbridge, a 
decision issued in his circuit capacity role, Story also expressed that
Congress had the constitutional authority to permit the enlistment of
minors into the Navy.318 Story, who had no military service of his own,
conceded that parents who placed children into the military contrary to
child’s desire would operate against the law; but because the skills and
discipline required of sailors were best developed over long years of
service, it would be appropriate to permit the enlistment of minors.319 Yet 
Story was hardly alone in his judicial views on minors being 
congressionally authorized to enlist into the army or navy with parental or
guardian permission.320 
There can be little doubt that Story is one of the leading justices to
have shaped constitutional law.321 Born in Marblehead, Massachusetts in
1779, he attended Harvard University and experienced the War of 1812 as
well as the conduct of the state militia and the Hartford Convention.322 
Prior to his appointment to the Court, he was a leading legal scholar, and
he had a brief sojourn into the legislative branch. On January 18, 1808,
Congressman Jacob Crowninshield died, and in November of that year,
Story served a 30-day stint as a member of the House of
317. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 109, 129–53 (1814) (Story,
J., dissenting).
318. United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 946 (C.C. Mass. 1816) (No. 14,
497).
319. Id. at 949–50.
320. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barker, 5 Binn. 423 (Pa. 1813). Justices
Tilghman and Yeates directed that a minor be remanded to military authority after
a “master” consented to his enlistment. And, in Commonwealth ex rel. Menges v.
Camac, 1 Serg. & Rawle 87 (Pa. 1814), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a
decision authored by Tilghman with Yeates joining, held that a minor who
enlisted without his parents’ permission (but later obtained such permission) and
deserted was subject to court-martial jurisdiction.
321. See, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, Supreme Court Superstars: The Ten
Greatest Justices, 31 TULSA L.J. 93 (1995); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME 
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 697 (1922).
322. On Story’s experience with the War of 1812, see NEWMYER, supra note
18, at 84. Newmyer noted that Story was disgusted with the “obstructionism” in
his home state of Massachusetts.
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2112021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
Representatives.323 During that time, he urged that President Jefferson’s
embargo against Britain was justifiable under both international and
constitutional law.324 Massachusetts Federalists, who generally supported
Britain over France, argued that without a declaration of war, a president
could not order an embargo.325 However, Story also argued to Congress
that the embargo did not serve the good of the nation.326 Madison, against
Jefferson’s advice, nominated Story to the Court on November 15,
1811.327 Gerald T. Dunne has called Story a “war hawk” counterpart to
Clay and Calhoun.328 
One of Story’s biographers noted that by the outbreak of the war, the
justice “harbored deep reservations about the democratic trend in
America.”329 Story would, in the years after Mott was issued, decry 
Andrew Jackson’s presidency and the expansion of unpropertied white
males into the nation’s franchise and professions.330 In 1818, Story wrote 
to a peer that the nation was in danger of being ruined by “intestine
divisions.”331 Story’s concern about a fractured people makes sense on
several levels. One only need recall the conduct of Connecticut’s governor
or the Massachusetts government’s and judiciary’s opposition to the war.
Interestingly, Story once articulated an opinion on Smith Thompson
and Daniel Tompkins in the same letter.332 “Of Thompson and Tompkins
I cannot say much, because they interfered very little in the business of the
Court,” Story began. “The former has a reputation of industry and
soundness. The latter is too young on the bench to have entitled himself
great consideration.”333 Story’s letter was written in 1807, well before
323. Gerald T. Dunne, Joseph Story: The Germinal Years, 75 HARV. L. REV. 
707, 737 (1962).
324. Id. at 740.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 739.
327. Morgan Dowd, Joseph Story and the Politics of Appointment, 9 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 265, 279–80 (1965). According to Dowd, Jefferson worried that Story 
would not uphold Jeffersonian Republicanism. On Jefferson’s displeasure with 
Story’s appointment, see also Gerald T. Dunne, Joseph Story: 1812 Overture, 77
HARV. L. REV. 240, 241 (1963).
328. Id.
329. MCCLELLAN, supra note 26, at 44.
330. WILENTZ, supra note 60, at 396–97.
331. Id.
332. Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel P.P. Fay (May 18, 1807), in JOSEPH
STORY, 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND DANE PROFESSOR OF LAW AT
HARVARD UNIVERSITY 143 (William W. Story ed., 2000).
333. Id.
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212 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Madison appointed him to the Court, and was an observation on the
workings of New York’s Supreme Court of Judicature.334 
Justice Smith Thompson, as previously noted, served on the New York
Supreme Court of Judicature between 1802 and 1818.335 Born in 1762, he
attended the College of New Jersey—the predecessor name for Princeton
University—where he “read law”; he was elected to the New York
Assembly in 1800 and was a delegate to the state constitutional convention
the next year.336 Thus, at the time of Mott, he had a first-hand
understanding of the state laws that enveloped each cause of action.
Perhaps equally important, in 1819, President James Monroe appointed
him Secretary of the Navy.337 Thompson remained politically ambitious as
evidenced by his attempts, while on the Court, to gain the Democratic-
Republican Party nomination in 1824 and to become New York’s
governor in 1828.338 In 1820, Martin Van Buren “hatched a plan” to have
Thompson run as Monroe’s vice president.339 Thompson’s biographer
noted that he had an adherence to the Tenth Amendment that neither
Marshall nor Story shared.340 
B. The Court-Martial of Jacob Mott
On September 24, 1814, Major General Morgan Lewis, the Third
Military District’s commanding officer, ordered a general court-martial to
prosecute all citizens who failed to muster into militia duty.341 A review of
the Third Military District’s records, specifically the inspector general’s
orderly books, now located in the United States National Archives and
Records Administration in Washington, D.C., evidence that Mott was
hardly alone as a “delinquent.” The 1795 Militia Act required 13 officers
334. Id.
335. Donald Malcolm Roper, Mr. Justice Thompson and the Constitution, at
44–80 (July 1963) (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University) (ProQuest).
336. Id. at 6.
337. Id. at 24.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 70.
341. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827). The order reads:
Adjutant General’s Office, 3d M. D. New-York, 24th September, 1814.
General Orders. A General Court Martial, under the act of Congress of
the 28th of February, 1795, for the trial of those of the militia of the State
of New-York, ordered into the service of the United States, in the third
military district, who have failed to rendezvous pursuant to orders, will 
convene on Monday, the 26th instant, at Harmony Hall, and will consist 
of the following members . . .
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2132021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
to sit in judgment of an accused—the term for a military defendant—but
the requirement was malleable if the commanding officer who convened
the court-martial could not assign 13 officers because of military
requirements. Morgan, having made this determination, assigned six
officers to the court-martial.342 Courts-martial did not have an independent
trial judge overseeing the fairness of the proceedings. Instead, the judge
advocate had a duty to prosecute soldiers, advise the court-martial, and
protect the rights of the accused soldier, including securing witnesses and
evidence.343 This triangle of duties might appear to be ethically unsound,
but as judge advocates were also officers, there was an expectation that all
three duties would be met.344 
Mott’s court-martial did not convene until May 30, 1818, and the
officers found him guilty of refusing to enter into the service of the United
States after being ordered to do so.345 The judge advocate assigned to
prosecute his trial was Samuel R. Betts, a militia captain, a member of
Congress, and a Democratic-Republican.346 Mott was further fined $96
and, if unable to pay, to serve one year in prison.347 Because he did not
have the means of paying the fine, the deputy marshal, Michael Martin,
seized Mott’s mare.348 In a seizure of property in instances when a debtor
ignored the duty to pay a just debt, the defendant who pled the lawfulness
of the seizure was known as an avowant and the pleading to the court an
avowry.349 
342. Id.
343. WINTHROP, supra note 41, at 190–96.
344. JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, THE BLACKSTONE OF MILITARY LAW:
COLONEL WILLIAM WINTHROP 239–44 (2009).
345. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, microformed on U.S. Supreme Court
Records and Briefs, Reel 72, F-274 (National Archives).
346. Id. at F-270. On Betts, see DAVID MCADAM, 2 HISTORY OF THE BENCH 
AND BAR OF NEW YORK 43–44 (1897).
347. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, microformed on U.S. Supreme Court
Records and Briefs, Reel 72, F-274 (National Archives).
348. See generally 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES BEFORE THE
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 110–21, §§ 1199–1216 (Thomas M. Cooley
ed., 4th ed. 1873).
349. See, e.g., PHINEAS PEMBARTON MORRIS, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF REPLEVIN IN THE UNITED STATES 121 (1849).
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214 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
C. State Proceedings in Martin v. Mott
The Supreme Court of Judicature’s records prior to 1847 were
destroyed, but a partial copy of the state judicial proceedings in Mott are 
preserved in the National Archives and Records Administration.350 On
January 17, 1823, New York’s lieutenant governor, Erastus Root,
forwarded to the United States Supreme Court the record of the state’s
Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Records, the
state’s highest court at the time.351 On December 19, 1822, New York’s
Chancellor James Kent forwarded the Supreme Court of Judicature’s
rulings to the state’s higher court.352 
From the available information that had been transmitted to the Court,
it can be discerned that Mott first took up his replevin action with a local
court of common pleas. That court, on October 13, 1819, agreed that
Martin’s seizure of his mare was premised on a deficient record from the
court-martial.353 Martin appeared before the Court of Common Pleas as
well as on appeal with little more than the orders convening the standing
court-martial and a certificate of Mott’s conviction and sentence, signed
by General Gerard Steddiford, the president of the court-martial.354 
Archibald Smith, a recent graduate of the Litchfield Law School,
represented Mott before the Supreme Court of Judicature.355 George A.
Schufeldt represented Martin, and he also represented Martin in Mills v.
350. “DUELY & CONSTANTLY KEPT”: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK SUPREME 
COURT, 1691-1847 AND AN INVENTORY OF ITS RECORDS (ALBANY, UTICA, AND
GENEVA OFFICES), 1797-1847 (1991) https://history.nycourts.gov/wp-content/up
loads/2018/11/History_Supreme-Court-Duely-Constantly-Kept.pdf [https://perma
.cc/85KG-ZC9E].
351. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, microformed on U.S. Supreme Court
Records and Briefs, Reel 72, F-255 (National Archives). Root had thrice served
in Congress as a Democratic-Republican and was a major general in the state’s
militia. See 3 JAMES WILSON, THE MEMORIAL HISTORY OF THE CITY OF NEW-
YORK FROM ITS FIRST SETTLEMENT TO THE YEAR 1892, at 631 (1892).
352. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, microformed on U.S. Supreme Court
Records and Briefs, Reel 72, F-259 (National Archives). On Kent, see David W.
Raack, “To Preserve the Best Fruits”: The Legal Thought of Chancellor James 
Kent, 33 J. AM. LEGAL HIST. 320–321 (1989) (Kent, along with Marshall and
Story, was considered to be one of the most influential figures in early American
legal history).
353. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, microformed on U.S. Supreme Court
Records and Briefs, Reel 72, F-261 (National Archives).
354. Id. at F-277.
355. Anon, THE LITCHFIELD LAW SCHOOL, 16 (1900 reprint).
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2152021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
Martin and Rathbun v. Martin.356 The Supreme Court of Judicature met in
Albany in August 1821, with Justice Ambrose Spencer presiding.357 
Spencer, like Tompkins and Lewis, was a Democratic-Republican, had
served as a presidential elector in 1808, and had been the state’s attorney 
general prior to his placement on the appellate court.358 
On a total of 19 bases, the Supreme Court of Judicature sided with
Mott in upholding the court of common pleas, or at least the somewhat
ambiguous ruling appeared to base its decision on cumulative errors
without specifying which errors.359 Martin, New York’s justices noted, had 
premised his seizure on the results of a federal court-martial that had failed
to cite with specificity, in terms of jurisdiction, the crimes that Mott had
been found guilty of. The justices agreed that Tompkins had ordered the
militia into service as a result of Madison’s requisition.360 Yet there was
no record of this presented in Martin’s avowry. Additionally, the court-
martial failed to conform to the Articles of War in that there were fewer
than 13 officers serving on the court and no attested statement by Lewis
as to why this had occurred.361 
The Sixty-Fourth Article of War required a minimum of 5 officers and
a maximum of 13, and the number could only be reduced below 13 if 
maintaining the 13 would be of “manifest injury to the service.”362 In 1819,
Attorney General William Wirt issued an opinion stating that unless a
court-martial explained why manifest injury to the army would occur if a
court-martial were required to possess 13 officers, the court-martial would
not be considered to have possessed jurisdiction.363 Ironically, Wirt would
represent Martin before the Court. The justices also noted that because the
standing court-martial had been “continued” since its inception until
Mott’s court-martial four years (and four successive orders) later, the
officers serving on the court-martial had been replaced at least four
356. In Mills, Schufeldt aligned with Martin Van Buren, a New York legislator
growing in popularity, but in Mott, he was alone.
357. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, microformed on U.S. Supreme Court
Records and Briefs, Reel 72, F-261 (National Archives).
358. JOEL MUNSELL, MEMORIAL OF AMBROSE SPENCER 29–42 (1849).
359. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, microformed on U.S. Supreme Court
Records and Briefs, Reel 72, F-261 (National Archives).
360. Id. at F-265.
361. Id.; but see WINTHROP, supra note 41. The Court in Mott later
characterized the issue of reduced numbers as being within a commanding
officer’s discretion and not reviewable by the courts. See Mott, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) at 35.
362. WINTHROP, supra note 41, at 981.
363. 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 296, 299–300 (1819).
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216 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
times.364 The implication in this observation was that the court-martial had
failed to maintain an adequate record of proof of its compliance with the
law.
The Supreme Court of Judicature found it problematic that in just
being presented with a certificate in the avowry, no independent proof had
been presented that Madison had adjudged that there “was an invasion or
imminent danger of invasion,” that Tompkin’s order had been in response 
to Madison’s requisition, or even that an actual order existed commanding
the militia to “rendezvous.”365 Moreover, Martin did not provide evidence
that Tompkins had even issued an order for the militia to muster or
rendezvous into federal service or that such an order, if it even existed, 
specifically applied to Mott. Furthermore, while Martin claimed that Mott
had been convicted of violating two of Tompkins’s orders, he could not,
or did not, produce a court-martial record showing what the orders were.366 
In other words, Mott was not placed on notice as to what he had been
convicted of.
Further, because the court-martial had occurred in a time of peace, the
justices were highly critical of the fact that there were less than 13 officers
sitting in judgment.367 And there was no proof that the five officers who
actually served on the court-martial were on duty at the time of their
service.368 Another matter that troubled the justices was the fact that there
was an absence of orders from the record.369 The justices also intimated 
that it was unclear in the record of proceedings whether either Lewis or
Tompkins was the senior ranking officer in the Third Military District.370 
Even the certificate signed by Steddiford did not, the justices noted, list
which officers served on Mott’s court-martial.371 
The justices concluded their ruling with the admonition that “after
mature deliberation,” it appeared “the avowry of the said defendant” was
“not sufficient” and awarded $146.40 to Mott. At no time did New York’s
justices determine that it was unconstitutional to court-martial a
delinquent. Instead, they refused to apply a doctrine of regularity to the
proceedings. That is, Martin lost his avowry in the courts because his
counsel may have assumed that the bare certificate of the court-martial
364. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, microformed on U.S. Supreme Court
Records and Briefs, Reel 72, F-269–72 (National Archives).
365. Id. at F-277.
366. Id. at F-279.
367. Id. at F-281.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. at F-282.
371. Id. at F-283.
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2172021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
conviction and sentence would be enough to defend against replevin at the
Court of Common Pleas. But this was not so. In 1958, the Court, in
Harmon v. Brucker, determined that the military was bound not only by
statute, but by its own regulations; and where it departed from either, it
could no longer maintain an action against a servicemember. 372 
By the time the Court granted review of Martin’s appeal, William Wirt
represented Martin. Wirt had served as attorney general in the Adams,
Jefferson, Madison, and Quincy Adams administrations.373 In this
capacity, he took part in several of the Marshall Court’s consequential
opinions.374 Thomas Oakley, a Federalist member of the House of
Representatives, initially represented Mott.375 However, some time before 
the Court issued the opinion, Mott’s attorney of record became David
Bayard Ogden, one of Alexander Hamilton’s associates.376 This fact may 
have reframed the appeal from a simple farmer who, among thousands,
decided that the war was harmful to his personal economic life, to a farmer
who joined with a moribund political party, which leading Democrats
believed had committed treason.
D. The Opinion
Story began the Court’s opinion with a general overview on how
Martin’s appeal traversed to the Court from New York’s Court for the
Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors, as well as why the
Supreme Court possessed jurisdiction.377 He determined that the basis for
jurisdiction rested in Mott’s challenge to the authority of the United States
because § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Court jurisdiction under
such circumstances.378 That section stated, in part, that the Court had 
jurisdiction over
372. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); see also Neil Ellis Jr., Judicial
Review of Promotions in the Military, 98 MIL. L. REV. 129, 135–36 (1982).
373. See Michael O. Oberg, William Wirt and the Trials of Republicanism, 99 
VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 305–11 (1991).
374. H.H. Hagan, William Wirt, 8 GEO. L.J. 12, 23 (1919–1920) (noting that
Marbury v. Madison might have been the only consequential opinion that Wirt
did not take a role in).
375. United States Supreme Court Minutes and Docket, 1384 (microfilm at
National Archives).
376. Thomas N. Baker, “An Attack Well Directed” Aaron Burr Intrigues for
the Presidency, 31 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 533, 561 (2011); On Ogden, see also
Christopher L. Doyle, The Randolph Scandal in Early National Virginia, 1792-
1815: New Voices in the “Court of Honour,” 69 J.S. HIST. 283, 302 n.39 (2003).
377. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 28 (1827).
378. Id. at 27 (citing to the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73).
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218 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
a final judgement or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law
or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had,
where it is drawn into question the validity of a treaty or statute
of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, and the
decision is against their validity.379 
In other words, Congress conferred jurisdiction where a state court issued
a ruling that could diminish the federal government’s power, even though
the United States was not a party.380 In 1821, in Cohens v. Virginia, the 
Court held that it possessed the jurisdiction to review, under certain
conditions, decisions by state courts of appeal arising from criminal
convictions.381 
Story next described Mott’s status and under what legal regime he
owed fealty. He approached this topic with the characterization that while
Mott was a state militia soldier, he failed to enter the service of the United
States when the president commanded him to do so. Story recognized that
Congress possessed the constitutional power to “call forth” the militia to
“execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions.”382 He also parroted the precise language of Article I that
Congress possessed the authority “to provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States.”383 He conceded that it was
not Congress that directly ordered Mott and thousands of his peers into 
service, but rather, the 1795 Militia Act delegated to the president the
authority to issue such an order, and to this end, Story did not question the 
validity of the act.384 
379. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 20, 1 Stat. 73.
380. See, for example, Kanouse v. Martin, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 23 (1853), in
which a New York state court denied a party’s motion to remove the litigation to
federal court, and the Supreme Court, in a brief decision authored by Chief Justice 
Taney, without ruling on the substantive question as to whether a federal district 
court would grant removal, noted that the state court’s usurpation of the federal
judicial authority to decide whether to remove was precisely the subject-matter
jurisdiction permitted by the § 25 of the Judiciary Act.
381. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821); see also, Kevin C. Walsh, In the 
Beginning There Was None: Supreme Court Review of State Criminal 
Prosecutions, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1867, 1869–1870 (2015).
382. Martin, 25 U.S. at 28.
383. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 16.
384. Martin, 25 U.S. at 29. On the constitutionality of the act, Story penned:
It has not been denied here, that the act of 1795 is within the
constitutional authority of Congress, or that Congress may not lawfully
provide for cases of imminent danger of invasion, as well as for cases 
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2192021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
Story also accepted that presidential authority, and in particular,
authority “confided” by Congress to a president, was of a “high and
delicate nature.”385 He recognized the framers’ caution against a standing
army by noting, “A free people are naturally jealous of the exercise of
military power; and the power to call the militia into actual service is
certainly felt to be one of no ordinary magnitude.”386 From this point, he
reassured the nation that presidential power over an expansive army was
limited to cases of actual invasion or the imminent threat of invasion.387 
Thus, although a president would remain commander in chief over a
standing army—albeit one which was subject to constitutional limitations
against its use in the states—a president’s commander in chief authority
over the expansive army was to be limited to very brief durations.388 But
he also insisted that the best means to repel an invasion was “to provide
the requisite force for action before the invader himself has reached the
soil.”389 
After establishing the predicate that presidential authority over the
expansive military was both constitutional and statutory in nature, and then
adding that the best means of defense for the United States to thwart a
foreign invasion was a sizeable military force, Story next directed the
opinion to the nature of commander in chief authority over the military
itself. To that end, he made clear that the decision to determine whether an
exigency existed rested solely with the president.390 Indeed, he foreclosed 
the possibility of judicial review over whether a foreign invasion was
imminent at all, and from that point, he moved the opinion to addressing
the nature of military command.391 “A prompt and unhesitating obedience 
to orders is indispensable to the complete attainment of the object,” he
penned. “The service is a military service, and the command of a military
nature; and in such cases, every delay, and every obstacle to an efficient
and immediate compliance, necessarily tend to jeopard the public
where an invasion has actually taken place. In our opinion there is no
ground for a doubt on this point, even if it had been relied on, for the
power to provide for repelling invasions includes the power to provide
against the attempt and danger of invasion, as the necessary and proper




387. Id. at 30.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 29.
390. Id. at 30.
391. Id. at 31.
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  224 11/19/21  12:01 PM




    
    
  







    
   
    






   
   
 
 
    





   
     
    
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
   
   
220 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
interests.”392 Up until this point, Story’s presentation of commander in
chief power was in establishing a two-fold basis for its existence. That is,
this authority existed in the plain text of Article II as well as in those
authorities Congress conferred to a president. The harm that a challenge
to this authority could cause, he claimed, was that if subordinates took the 
time to consider whether the president was correct in his assessment of an
emergency, they in fact could aid an enemy, even where there was no
intent to do so.393 
From noting the power of the commander in chief to issue orders,
Story next discussed the nature of a state militia relationship to the states.
He began with Federalist No. 29 for the proposition that once the militia
becomes a part of the federal army, its soldiers also become subject to the
president’s orders.394 He then added that militia officers who questioned
presidential authority were complicit in subversion in the ranks.395 Jacob
Mott, of course, was an enlisted soldier, and Story’s line of reasoning, no
matter how accurate, did not directly apply to this appeal.
Story acknowledged that there was a possibility that a president would
abuse power, though he cautioned that it was unlikely to occur.396 In those
instances, Congress, rather than soldiers, had the authority to redress the
abuse of power.397 So too, Story opined, did the frequency of elections
present a means to remove a president.398 To this end, he lauded the
decision of Justice Ambrose Spencer from the New York Supreme Court
392. Id. at 30.
393. Id. Here, Story penned: “While subordinate officers or soldiers are
pausing to consider whether they ought to obey, or are scrupulously weighing the
evidence of the facts upon which the commander in chief exercises the right to
demand their services, the hostile enterprise may be accomplished without the
means of resistance.” Id.
394. Id.
395. Id. Story wrote:
If a superior officer has a right to contest the orders of the President upon
his own doubts as to the exigency having arisen, it must be equally the
right of every inferior officer and soldier; and any act done by any person
in furtherance of such orders would subject him to responsibility in a 
civil suit, in which his defence must finally rest upon his ability to
establish the facts by competent proofs. Such a course would be
subversive of all discipline, and expose the best disposed officers to the 





360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  225 11/19/21  12:01 PM




   
  
  
      
   
  
  
    
  
    
  
  
   
  
 
   
  
  
   
  
 
   
   
    
    
   
   
 
   
 










   
2212021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
of Judicature in Vanderheyden.399 As in Vanderheyden, Mott argued that
presidential authority to order the militia into service was confined by
statute, and because Madison failed to state with specificity the basis for
the emergency, the avowry itself was defective.400 But Story responded
that when a president exercises a congressionally delegated authority, the 
exercise is presumed to be lawful.401 And Story went so far as to posit that
the president was entitled to secrecy regarding the decision to declare the
immediacy of an emergency and that this authority resided in the 1795
Militia Act.402 
It took Story and the Court over two-thirds of the opinion to create the
predicate of executive authority before Mott’s specific defenses against
court-martial jurisdiction were considered. In response to Mott’s claim
that the president never called him into federal service, the Court
responded that a presidential requisition for militia forces and a governor’s
corresponding order for a call-up of militia were, in fact, an inseparable
presidential order.403 In regard to Mott’s objections that he was not
amenable to court-martial jurisdiction, Story answered that the Militia Act
permitted prosecutions for delinquencies to occur.404 This was not a 
particularly compelling argument, because several state supreme courts 
had already operated on the basis that courts-martial of delinquents were 
399. Id. at 32.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 33.
402. Id. at 31.
Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be
exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule
of construction, that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive
judge of the existence of those facts. And, in the present case, we are all 
of opinion that such is the true construction of the act of 1795.
Id. 
403. Id. at 33.
The objection, so far as it proceeds upon a supposed difference between
a requisition and an order, is untenable; for a requisition calling forth the
militia is, in legal intendment, an order, and must be so interpreted in this
avowry. The majority of the Court understood and acted upon this sense,
which is one of the acknowledged senses of the word, in Houston v.
Moore, 18 U.S. 1 (1820). It was unnecessary to set forth the orders of the
President at large; it was quite sufficient to state that the call was in
obedience to them.
Id. 
404. Id. at 34.
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222 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
permittable.405 Another of Mott’s arguments was that the commanding
officer who convened the court-martial had not approved of the sentence
of the court-martial.406 To this point, Story responded that, consistent with 
the Articles of War, President James Monroe had done so.407 Mott’s final
two arguments, that he was not amenable to military jurisdiction in time
of peace and that the court-martial had fewer than 13 officers as required
by the Articles of War, were also quickly dismissed by the Court.408 
E. An Abbreviated Aftermath
At the height of the Civil War and in response to the federal draft law,
Pennsylvania’s supreme court twice reviewed Congress’ authority to
conscript citizens in Kneedler v. Lane.409 In the first decision, Justice John
Read dissented from the majority’s position that a state court could declare
an act of Congress unconstitutional and then claimed that Mott “solemnly
overruled” the opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that 
the governor, rather than the president, was empowered to declare an
emergency.410 Read observed that the Federalist government officials who
opposed the war had “entertained designs of treasonable character.”411 It
is worthwhile to note that opponents of the war were often accused of
treason, and as late as 1990, one of Madison’s biographers hyperbolically
penned that shortly after the war commenced “opposition to the war soon
reached near-treasonable proportions.”412 Of course, not all historians
agree with this characterization. Professor Linda Kerber, who also wrote
on this history of the Federalist Party, insisted that during the war,
405. See, e.g., State v. Chambers, 1 N.J.L. 458 (1795); Wilson v. John, 2 Binn.
209 (Pa. 1809); Taylor v. Burris, 16 Ky. 183 (1816); State v. Kirby, 5 N.J.L. 982
(1820).
406. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 33.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863). For a brief history of both opinions,
see J.L. Bernstein, Conscription and the Constitution: The Amazing Case of
Kneedler v. Lane, 53 A.B.A. L.J. 708–712 (1967). See also Tyler v. Pomeroy, 90 
Mass. 480 (1864).
410. Kneedler, 45 Pa. at 284 (Read, J., dissenting).
411. Id. at 293.
412. RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 528 (1990). Professor
Ketcham explained: “When Congress adjourned in early June, the Federalist 
minority published an address to their constituents voicing British arguments on
American maritime grievances, justifying votes against the war, and ominously
calling on the people to obstruct its prosecution.” Id.
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2232021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS
Federalist political leaders “stayed well within the Constitution.”413 
Whether Justice Story or the Court believed Mott was treasonous or simply
a misguided citizen is absent from the record.
It is also difficult to know whether a person’s beliefs 15 years 
subsequent to an event were held by the person at the time of the event. In 
1842, Captain Alexander Mackenzie on the U.S.S. Somers accused a junior
officer named Phillip Spencer and two other sailors of mutiny and ordered
all three executed.414 Spencer was the son of Secretary of War John
Spencer, and this fact, as well as the avid writing on the subject by James
Fenimore Cooper, led to a public outcry and demand for a civil murder
trial against Mackenzie.415 The Navy ultimately court-martialed 
Mackenzie for cruelty and exceeding his authority, but the court-martial 
acquitted Mackenzie.416 Story, according to Charles Sumner, publicly 
came to Mackenzie’s defense.417 One can surmise, however, that Story’s 
endorsement of Mackenzie’s action to summarily execute three sailors
was at least partly rooted in his view of the sanctity of a chain of command.
After all, Mackenzie held an officers’ commission from a president, and
this empowered him to control a vessel and its crew. Mackenzie’s actions,
no matter how barbaric, were permissible under law to preserve his
command.
The traverse of Mott as a consequential authority through the Civil 
War was, in fact, narrowly confined to the question of evidentiary proofs
in military cases as in assessing presidential authority to declare a crisis.418 
In Wilkes v. Dinsman in 1849, the Court determined that a marine who was 
held onboard a vessel during a distant scientific exploration and punished
by his commanding officer had to prove in his civil suit that the
413. Linda K. Kerber, “The Federalist Party,” in 1 ARTHUR SCHLESINGER JR.,
HISTORY OF UNITED STATES POLITICAL PARTIES, 1789-1860 (1973).
414. 1 JONATHAN LURIE, ARMING MILITARY JUSTICE: THE ORIGINS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS, 1775-1950, at 21 (1992).
415. Id. On Cooper’s role, see, Hugh Egan, The Mackenzie Court-Martial 
Trial: Cooper’s Secret Correspondence with William H. Norris, STUDIES IN THE
AMERICAN RENAISSANCE 149–52 (1990).
416. LURIE, supra note 414, at 21–22.
417. Id.; see also, ROBERT A. FERGUSON, PRACTICE EXTENDED: BEYOND LAW
AND LITERATURE 231–32 (2016).
418. See, e.g., McTyler v. McDowell, 36 Al. 39, 46 (1860); Reed v. Conway,
20 Mo. 22 (1854). Also relevant is In re Al-Nashiri, a decision arising from a
captured belligerent’s challenge to the status of military judges serving as trial
judges in military commissions trials. 791 F.3d 71, 83–84 (D.C. Cir. 2015). There,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined, in citing to Mott, 
that had the Secretary of Defense removed a judge on the basis of necessity, the 
court would have granted expansive deference over the removal decision. Id.
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224 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
commanding officer had unlawfully detained him, rather than the
commanding officer having to prove that it would not have caused
manifest injury to the vessel to permit the Marine to depart.419 The Naval
statute was worded in a manner similar to the Articles of War, requiring 
13 officers to serve on a court-martial unless it would cause “injury to the
Army.”420 Both Chief Justice Roger Taney and Justice Levi Woodbury 
mentioned Mott in Luther v. Borden, but only as an affirmation that a
president possesses the authority to call the militia into service.421 
However, during the Dorr Rebellion—the event preceding Luther— 
President John Tyler did not federalize the militia and instead decided to
remove the federal government from Rhode Island’s rebellion.422 There is 
a short mention of Mott in Ex Parte Vallandigham, in which the Court
noted that a president, rather than the judiciary, was the arbiter of what
constituted an emergency.423 
The Court first expanded Mott beyond the relationship between a
servicemember and a commander in chief or one of his subordinate
officers in a footnote in United States v. Speed, an opinion arising out of a
contract dispute between a hog butcher and the secretary of war.424 The 
Court recognized that the hog butcher’s contract may have been
deleterious to the government’s interest, but the officers responsible for
entering into it acted within the discretion of the law, and therefore the 
judiciary would not usurp the contract.425 In 1886, the Court in Wales v. 
Whitney determined that even when a federal court has the authority to
issue a writ of prohibition, it may not do so to stop a court-martial from 
proceeding, unless the court-martial does not possess jurisdiction over the
person being prosecuted.426 After taking cognizance of several British
military decisions, the Court cited to Mott for the proposition that in the 
absence of “positive enactments of law,” the officers convening and
serving on courts-martial were presumed to have a greater knowledge of
military procedures and usages than the courts.427 
419. Wilkes v. Dinsman,48 U.S. 89, 130 (1849).
420. Id. at 123–25.
421. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 44 (1849).
422. WILENTZ, supra note 60, at 539–46.
423. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243, 254 (1863). The limited use of Mott
in Vallandigham is important to recognize because the Court did not find Mott as 
justifying Vallandigham’s military trial and imprisonment, but rather that the
president is the final decider on whether an emergency has arisen.
424. United States v. Speed, 75 U.S. 77 (1869).
425. Id. at 83–84.
426. Wales v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 176 (1886).
427. Id. at 179.
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2021] THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN CRISIS 225
Wales appears to be the first instance in which the Court expanded
Mott beyond its narrow confines of a presidential determination of national
emergencies and military orders being immune from immediate judicial
review. In 1921, the Court in Kahn v. Anderson determined, in citing to
Mott, that the numbers of officers appointed to a court-martial would not
be a matter for appellate review.428 In 1932, the Court expanded the rule
of non-review of presidential declarations of emergency to gubernatorial
declarations.429 Perhaps the Court’s three most egregious extensions of
Mott began in 1940 with United States v. George S. Bush & Co, Inc..430 
The Court cited to Mott in upholding Congress’ grant to the executive to
determine tariff rates, an action that might be entitled to judicial deference
but that certainly is not based on a unique commander in chief authority.431 
In 1974, the Court in Parker v. Levy stretched Mott to find that the Court
has broadly approved of the enforcement of military customs.432 Justice 
William Rehnquist clearly exaggerated Mott to uphold speech and conduct
limitations on servicemembers subject to military law, as Mott had nothing
to do with servicemembers degrading a president or making mutinous
statements against the war.
In between these two opinions resides the worst extension of Mott to 
violate the civil rights of citizens. In Hirabayashi v. United States, the
Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Harlan Stone, cited to Mott
for the proposition that the judiciary could not inquire into presidential
responses to a national emergency.433 Finally, in 2011, in General
Dynamics v. United States, the Court utilized Mott for the purpose of
explaining that at times, the broad arena of national security requires the 
428. Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 6 (1921). In 1897, the Court in Swaim v.
United States had likewise determined this to be the case. 165 U.S. 533, 559 (1897).
429. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399–400 (1932).
430. United States v. George S. Bush & Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 371 (1940).
431. Id. at 380. In Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., the Court also cited to Mott
to uphold a delegation from Congress to the president to withdraw public lands
for reservations. 337 U.S. 86, 101 n.18 (1949).
432. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974).
433. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943). In upholding a
curfew imposed with criminal penalties on United States citizens of Japanese
descent, the Court, in citing to Mott, held: 
Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the
exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of
warfare, it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of
judgment and discretion in determining the nature and extent of the
threatened injury or danger and in the selection of the means for resisting
it.
Id.
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226 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
acceptance of governmental secrecy.434 While the Court in Mott intimated
that presidential decisions might need to be shielded from public view, the
specific language that Story used was limited to presidential
determinations of “imminent danger of invasion.”435 
CONCLUSION
The Court in Mott, it should be remembered, granted an appeal from
a state judiciary that had ruled adversely to the federal government, and in
reversing the state judiciary, the justices never intimated that the state had
unconstitutionally interfered with the federal government. Story and the
Court, in fact, accepted that a state judicial official could rule adversely to 
the federal government, even on military matters. This is hardly a big step
to creating a “muscled” commander in chief. Mott’s legal history, when
taken as a whole, should hardly be used to build a unitary executive. To 
the contrary, in the midst of an unpopular war, with Federalists being
considered to have committed treason, all the Court in Mott did was 
reinforce the authority of officers, as well as the commander in chief, to 
issue orders free from judicial interference. The judiciary remained free to
review an extensive array of other military actions.
434. General Dynamics v. United States, 563 U.S. 478, 484 (2011).
435. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 31 (1827).
